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CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE FROM SCUD ATTACKS  




 The proliferation of ballistic missiles has in recent years become a major international 
security concern.  This increased concern is in part due to the highly visible role played by Iraqi 
Scud missiles during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  However, it is also due to the widespread -- but 
incorrect -- perception that even conventionally-armed ballistic missiles are tremendously 
destructive.2 
 This perception that ballistic missiles are inherently weapons of great destructive 
capability may have played a key role in the politics of the Gulf War.  Iraq fired more than 80 
modified Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, causing 31 
deaths, numerous injuries, and substantial property damage.  However, with the exception of the 
Scud that hit a barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and killed 28 U.S. soldiers, the number of 
casualties caused by these Scuds was much lower than was generally anticipated.  During the war, 
                                               
    1 A short version of this paper was published as Steve Fetter, George N. Lewis, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Why 
Were Scud Casualties So Low?" Nature, 28 January 1993, pp. 293-296. 
 Some of the numbers in this paper are different from the those in the Nature paper due to additional 
information we have received since the short version was completed.  In the Nature paper, we estimated, based on 
news media reports, that 10 to 11 Scud warheads detonated in Israeli metropolitan areas.  Based on recent 
interviews conducted in Israel by Reuven Pedatzur, we have now been able to identify a total of 13 Scud warheads 
that detonated in Israeli metropolitan areas; in addition, we are now able to produce a map of the impact points.  
We also now have some additional information about dud Scud warheads and Patriots that dove into the ground in 
Israel.  Finally, the figure for the number of Scuds fired at Israel was 38 in the Nature paper; since the U.S. Army 
now appears to use a figure of 39, that is used here (with the additional Scud falling on January 18). 
    2 Ballistic missiles are often referred to as "weapons of mass destruction," without regard to the nature of their 
warheads.  While missiles armed with nuclear, biological, and, under some circumstances, chemical warheads 
deserve that designation, a high-explosive warhead delivered by a missile is not significantly more destructive than 
the same amount of explosive delivered by other means, and should not be termed a weapon of mass destruction.  
For a discussion of the destructive capabilities of ballistic missiles armed with different types of warheads, see 
Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?," 
International Security, Summer 1991, pp. 5-42.  For an assessment of the military effectiveness of ballistic missiles 
relative to attack aircraft, see John R. Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: 





the Patriot missile system was credited with almost complete success in intercepting the Iraqi 
Scud missiles, and the low casualty rate (relative to the public's expectations) seemed to confirm 
Patriot's success.  The belief on the part of the Israeli population that they were being successfully 
defended by Patriot was crucial in keeping Israel out of the war. 
 Since the end of war, the casualties caused by the Scuds have become part of the debate 
over the effectiveness of the Patriot missile defense system.  Several analysts have cited the 
relatively low casualty rate as evidence of the success of Patriot3, while others have argued that 
                                               
    3  Robert M. Stein, Manager of Advanced Air Defense Systems for the Raytheon Company, has argued that "the 
one or two civilian deaths directly related to TBMs [tactical ballistic missiles] in Israel and no civilian deaths in 
Saudi Arabia contrasted sharply with the effects of Scuds against other countries without anti-TBM (ATBM) 
defense, such as the "War of the Cities" between Iraq and Iran, in which TBMs killed or injured more than 5000 
Iranian citizens, and in Afghanistan when three Scuds killed 300 people on a single day . . . the casualty rates per 
TBM in Israel and Saudi Arabia differed from those in the comparison examples by orders of magnitude.  Such 
differences transcend the possible variations in circumstances. . . ."  (Robert Stein, "Correspondence: Patriot 
Experience in the Gulf War," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), p. 200.)  Stein acknowledges 
in a footnote the 28 U.S. military personnel killed when a Scud, which Patriot failed to engage, struck a barracks in 
Dhahran on 25 February 1991.  Similar statistics were cited by Charles Zraket, a Scholar in Residence at Harvard 
University's Center for Science and International Affairs and past CEO of the MITRE Corporation,  as evidence of 
Patriot effectiveness in his Defense News article "Patriot Gave Stellar Gulf Performance," 9 December 1991, p. 31. 
 Both Zraket and Peter Zimmerman, a physicist and Senior fellow for Arms Control and Verification at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, gave testimony to the Subcommittee on Legislation and National 
Security of the House Committee on Government Operations during hearings on the performance of the Patriot 
missile in the Gulf War on 7 April 1992, in which they asserted that there was a "common sense" argument that 
Patriot was successful because no catastrophic damage occurred.  In his testimony, Zraket stated "...if you don't 
have a lot of catastrophic damage in an area and say in Israel or in eastern Saudi Arabia, when something like over 
30 Scuds fell in each of the inhabited areas and almost 50 were fired into each area, then common sense tells you 
that something is going on that's preventing that catastrophic damage."  During later questioning by 
Representative Steven Neal, Zimmerman stated, ". . . the common-sense argument that Dr. Zraket has made 
indicates to me very clearly that large numbers--reasonable fractions--of the incoming al-Hussein missiles were 
interdicted, were neutralized, and were prevented from causing damage on the ground." (Performance of the 
Patriot Missile in the Gulf War, Hearing before the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, April 7, 1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 179, 209.)  More recently, Zimmerman again stated that a common-sense 
case could be made that Patriot was modestly successful in defending Israel because the Scuds did not cause as 
much damage as might have been expected  (Max Boot, "New US House Committee Report Will Say Patriot 
Missile Failed," Christian Science Monitor, 23 September 1992, p. 9.). 
 These arguments have been repeated in several editorials and opinion pieces, including "An Unjustly 
Criticized Patriot" by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Wall Street Journal, 8 April 1992, p. A20), and "Conyers vs. the 
Patriots" (Detroit News, 13 April 1992, p. 8), which states that "Saddam Hussein lobbed 40 Scuds at Israeli cities, 
and no significant damage occurred in the areas defended by Patriot batteries....compare that with the 1988 Iran-
Iraq "War of the Cities" when Iraq launched 125 Scuds at Teheran and other populated areas, killing 1,000 to 
2,000 Iranians."  Former U.S. Congressman Frank Horton similarly argues that ". . . the historical evidence that 
when tactical ballistic missiles are shot at defenseless civilians, casualties are high, but that in Desert Storm, the 
only situation where civilian populations were defended--by Patriot--casualties were exceedingly low." (Frank 





the same casualty data suggests that the Patriot may not have been very successful.4 
 In the nearly two years since the end of the Gulf War, however, it has become apparent 
that Patriot was far less effective in intercepting Scuds than was believed during the war.5  How 
then can the apparently low casualties caused by the Scud attacks be explained? 
 In this paper, we review the casualty rate from previous ballistic missile attacks, compare 
this to the experience in the Gulf War by taking into account differences in population density 
and warhead size, and examine a variety of other factors that may account for the casualty rate in 
the Scud attacks on Israel.  We primarily focus on Israel because relatively little data is available 
from Saudi Arabia.  We conclude that there were a number of factors that, taken together, 
appear to be able to account for the number of deaths and serious injuries in Israel.  The most 
important of these factors were the inaccuracy of the modified Scud missile; its small warhead 
and breakup upon atmospheric reentry; the availability of attack warning, which allowed citizens 
to take shelter; and Israeli construction practices, which prevented buildings from collapsing and 
burying their occupants.  Finally, simple good fortune may have played a role.  The available data 
do not support claims that Patriot played a significant role in reducing casualties.  We conclude 
with some observations on lessons learned that may be relevant to future ballistic missile attacks. 
 
PREVIOUS BALLISTIC-MISSILE ATTACKS 
 In order to put the casualties and damage in Israel into perspective, it is useful to review 
the effects of previous ballistic missile attacks.  Before the 1991 Gulf War, ballistic missiles had 
been used extensively in war only three times: the Germans launched over 3,000 V-2 missiles 
against urban British and European targets during World War II; Iraq and Iran together launched 
nearly 1,000 missiles against each other's cities during the 1980-88 Persian Gulf War; and the 
Kabul government fired over 2,000 Soviet-made Scud missiles against Mujahideen guerrillas in 
                                               
    4 Theodore A. Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War Patriot Experience," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 
(Winter 1991/92), pp. 119-171.  This paper notes that the deployment of Patriot in Israel did not appear to have 
reduced the damage per Scud missile relative to that before Patriot was deployed. 
    5 After the war, the U.S. Army claimed a 96% success rate.  The Army's currently claims a 40% success rate in 
Israel and a 70% success rate in Saudi Arabia.  However, only 40% of the Army's claimed successful intercepts are 
in the Army's "highest confidence" category.  See John Conyers, Jr., "The Patriot Myth: Caveat Emptor," Arms 





the Afghanistan civil war.  In all cases the missiles were armed with conventional high-explosive 
warheads.  Detailed information on casualties and physical damage is, however, available only for 
the V-2 attacks on London.   
 
The V-2 Attacks on London 
 From September 1944 until March 1945, Germany launched over 3,000 V-2 ballistic mis-
siles at targets in Britain and continental Europe.6  Of the approximately 1,400 V-2s fired against 
Britain, 518 fell in the London Civil Defense District.  In addition, nearly 10,000 V-1 cruise 
missiles were fired against London, and although most of them malfunctioned or were destroyed 
by British defenses, roughly 2,420 V-1s fell in London. 
 
Casualties 
 Table 1 gives the number of deaths and injuries that resulted from V-1 and V-2 impacts in 
the London area.7  Although the V-2 and the V-1 missiles produced roughly equal areas of 
physical destruction (see below), the number of casualties (deaths and injuries) per V-2 impact in 
London was about twice that caused by the V-1.  The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded 
that the lower casualty rate for the V-1 was due to the fact that people in the target area could 
hear the V-1 approach and could take cover before its warhead exploded,8 while the V-2 gave no 
warning of its approach.9   
                                               
    6 The primary sources of the V-2 statistics cited in this paper are: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical 
Damage Division, V-Weapons in London, Report No. 152, January 1947; Air Chief Marshall Sir Roderic Hill, "Air 
Operations by Air Defence of Great Britain And Fighter Command in Connection with the German Flying Bomb 
and Rocket Offensives, 1944-45," London Gazette, 20 October 1948, pp. 5585-5617; C.L. Dunn, The Emergency 
Medical Services, vol. 1: England and Wales (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), pp. 170-180; M.C. 
Helfers, The Employment of V-Weapons by the Germans During World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, 
Office of the Chief of Military History, 31 May 1954); Terrence H. O'Brien, Civil Defence (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1955); and Norman Longmate, The Doodlebugs: The Story of the Flying Bombs (London: 
Hutchinson, 1981). 
    7 The London area is defined by the boundaries of the wartime London Civil Defense District.   
    8 V-1s flew at a constant altitude until a timing device caused the missile to go into a steep dive, which cut off 
the flow of fuel to the engine.  People in the target area knew that when the sound of the engine stopped, an 
explosion would soon follow, typically in 8 to 12 seconds. 









Table 1.  Deaths and injuries from V-1 and V-2 impacts in the London area.10 
 
                                       Casualties                           Casualties per Missile       
        Number of                  Serious      Slight                         Serious       Slight 
         Missiles       Deaths     Injuries      Injuries         Deaths     Injuries      Injuries 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
V-1       2420     5,370       15,250    19,900        2.2          6.3           8.2 
V-2        518       2,510        6,050     13,200        4.8         11.7          25.5 
  







Table 2.  The number of houses destroyed or seriously damaged by V-1 or V-2  
impacts in the London area. 
 
Number of             Number of Houses                         Houses per Missile         
Missiles        Destroyed      Seriously Damaged       Destroyed    Seriously Damaged 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 2938              29,400           170,000+                 10                    58+ 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
blown over, but blasted into small pieces), which may have resulted in the suffocation of victims buried under the 
debris who might otherwise have survived.  However, if this was a significant factor, we would expect the death 
rate for the V-2 relative to that of the V-1 to increase more than the injury rate.  Since both deaths and injuries per 
missile are greater for the V-2 by roughly a factor of two, the more intense disintegration of debris produced by the 
V-2 does not appear to be a decisive factor in increasing the death rate.  
    10 Some sources give figures for deaths which are slightly (up to about 10%) higher.  In addition, these figures 
are for civilians only and do not include casualties among military personnel, which were about 5% of the total for 
the V-1 attacks (Kenneth P. Werrell, Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based 
Air Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 19).  Thus the figures in Table 1 







 More than a million homes were damaged by the nearly 3,000 V-1 and V-2 missiles that 
fell in the London area, although most of these suffered only light damage.  It is difficult to sort 
out damage caused by the V-2s from that caused by the V-1s; the available data suggests that, on 
a per missile basis, they caused roughly equal amounts of damage.  These data, which are 
summarized in Table 2, indicate that about ten houses were destroyed and sixty seriously 
damaged per missile impact.   
 The effects of a number of V-1 and V-2 impacts were investigated in detail by the British, 
and the results of these investigations were published in the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.11  
The British compared the effects of the V-1 and V-2 missile warheads with those of the German 
SC bomb on brick row houses, which were a common building type in London.  All three 
weapons contained roughly equal amounts of high-explosive (HE); Table 3 gives the total mass 
and the mass of HE for each weapon, and the mass of TNT that would result in an equivalent 
explosive yield. 
 In calculating the total explosive energy released on impact, the kinetic energy of the 
warhead must be taken into account.  This contribution is quite small for the SC bomb and the 
V-1 cruise missile, since their velocities at impact were relatively small.12  The V-2, on the other 
hand, reached a terminal velocity of about 800 meters per second;13 in this case  
                                               
    11 Strategic Bombing Survey, V-Weapons in London. 
    12 A 1-tonne (1,000-kilogram) mass traveling at the speed of sound (330 meters per second) would have a 
kinetic energy of ½mv2 = ½(1000 kg)(330 m/s)2 = 54 megajoules (MJ); since 1 kilogram of TNT releases 4.6 MJ, 
this is equivalent to 12 kilograms of TNT per tonne of mass, or only about 1% of the energy released by an equal 
mass of TNT.  Since the impact velocities of the bomb and the V-1 were substantially less than the speed of sound, 
the contribution of their kinetic energy to the explosive yield will be less than 1% of the total and can therefore be 
neglected. 
    13 Gregory P. Kennedy, Vengeance Weapon 2: The V-2 Guided Missile (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1983), p. 18. To achieve this velocity, the empty missile must have had a ballistic coefficient 
("â ") of about 8500 kg/m2 (1700 lb/ft2), assuming a burnout velocity of 1600 meters per second, a burnout altitude 
of 28 kilometers, and a reentry angle of 45 degrees; since â  = M/CdA, where M is the mass (4000 kilograms) and A 
is the area (2.14 m2), this corresponds to a drag coefficient Cd of about 0.22.  This value is in agreement with 
German measurements, which found that Cd was 0.22 at a velocity of 800 meters per second.  Hermann H. 
Kurzweg, "The Aerodynamic Development of the V-2," in T.H. Benecke and A.W. Quick, History of German 







Table 3.  Characteristics of the German SC bomb and the V-1 and V-2 warheads. 
 
                  Type of               Mass (kg) of                  Energy (kg TNT equiv.)a  
Weapon           HE                 Device       HE                HE     Kinetic     Total 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
SC Bomb        Amatol              1089         620                 520       ---b       520 
 V-1              52A                   900         849                 800       ---b       800 
 V-2              Amatol               978         736                 620       280       900 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, V-Weapons in London. 
aAmatol (60% TNT, 40% ammonium nitrate) releases about 84% as much energy as an equal mass of TNT; 52A (a mixture 
of RDX, ammonium nitrate, dinitro benzine, and calcium nitrate) is about 94% as energetic as TNT.  Explosive 
energy releases estimated from data in Gilbert Ford Kinney, Explosive Shocks in Air (New York: Macmillan, 1963).   







Table 4.   Average damage radii (meters) and corresponding peak overpressures (psi) 
for three types of weapons against brick-row houses for three levels of damage: 
completely destroyed ("A"), damaged beyond repair ("B"), and seriously damaged but  
habitable with repairs ("C"). 
 
          Number of              Damage Radius (m)             Overpressure (psi) 
Weapon       Explosions         A      B       C                 A       B       C 
________________________________________________________________________ 
SC Bomb           5                      l6     26      48               32.6    10.2  3.5 
V-1                 19                     22     31      52               19.7     9.7  3.9 
V-2                 22                     23     31      57               18.9    10.6  3.6 
________________________________________________________________________ 





the kinetic energy of the missile is a significant fraction of the energy released by the HE.14  Table 
3 gives the kinetic energy and the total energy released by the impact and detonation of each 
weapon.15  The average damage radii of each of these weapons against a brick row-houses are 
given in Table 4.  Radii are given for three levels of damage: completely destroyed ("A"), damaged 
beyond repair ("B"), and seriously damaged but habitable with repairs ("C").  Note that the 
damage radii for the V-1 and V-2 are quite similar for each level of damage, with the V-2 being 
slightly more destructive (which is consistent with its slightly greater energy release on impact).  
The SC bomb, which released significantly less energy on impact, had smaller damage radii. 
 Since in each case the damage to the structures was due almost exclusively to blast, we 
should expect that for each given level of damage ("A," "B," or "C") the radii for the three 
different weapons would correspond to about the same peak overpressure.  Table 4 lists the peak 
overpressures from each weapon at the radii for "A," "B," and "C" damage.16  Note that, with the 
exception of the "A" level damage for the SC bomb, there is excellent agreement in every case.17  
In general, brick row houses were completely destroyed at overpressures greater than roughly 20 
pounds per square inch (psi), damaged beyond repair at about 10 psi, and severely damaged but 
repairable at overpressures of about 3 to 4 psi.18  The excellent agreement in the overpressures at 
                                               
    14 A 4-tonne missile traveling at a speed of 800 meters per second would have a kinetic energy of ½(4,000)(800)2 
= 1300 MJ, which is equivalent to 280 kilograms of TNT. 
    15 The table does not include the energy released by unburned fuel that may have remained in the tanks of the 
missiles; the Strategic Bombing Survey makes no mention of this or of its possible contribution to the initial 
explosion or subsequent fires.  If one percent of the gasoline remained in the V-1s tanks at impact, the additional 
energy released would have been equivalent to 50 kilograms of TNT; in the case of the V-2, one percent of the 
alcohol fuel would have been equivalent to 250 kilograms of TNT.   
    16 The overpressures given here are calculated assuming that the weapons are ground-burst.  Data for the 
overpressure as a function of distance from the explosion were taken from Kinney, Explosive Shocks in Air, p. 188, 
for a free air burst of a 1-ton spherical charge of TNT at sea level.  If the ground was an ideal reflector, the 
overpressures from a ground burst would be twice that of a free air burst of the same yield.  Because some of the 
explosive energy is expended in ground shock and cratering, however, the actual yield for a ground burst is only 
about 1.6 times greater.  The factor of 1.6 can be derived from data in Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds., 
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1977), figs. 3.72 and 3.73. 
    17 The exception of the level "A" damage from the SC bomb may be due to the relatively small number of 
observations in this case (five), combined with the fact that small variations in the height of burst or the immediate 
surroundings of the blast would result in much larger variations in the radius of level "A" damage. 





which a given degree of damage occurs from these three very different types of weapons should 
give us a measure of confidence in using these results to predict damage from missile attacks in 
similar circumstances.19   
 It is informative to compare the average radii for deaths and injuries with those for 
damage to brick row houses.  This can be done by dividing the average number of casualties per 
missile impact by the average population density of London to find the area per missile, and then 
calculating the radius of that area.  The average population density of London during the missile 
attacks is difficult to estimate because of widespread evacuation.  The V-1 attacks began in June 
1944; by August, 1.45 million people (about 20 percent of the population) were estimated to 
have left London.20  In July, the nighttime population was estimated at 6.75 million.21  Assuming 
that these population estimates correspond to the London Civil Defense Region, the population 
density during the V-weapon attacks was about 3,600 per square km.22  Thus, in the case of the 
V-2 attacks, the average radii for deaths, serious injuries, and slight injuries were 21, 32, and 48 
meters, which are comparable to the radii for the "A" (destroyed),  "B" (damaged beyond repair), 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
explosions on buildings.  In nuclear tests in Nevada, unreinforced, two-story brick houses were exposed to peak 
overpressures of 5 and 1.7 psi.  At 5 psi, the houses were completely destroyed; at 1.7 psi the damage was 
considerable but the houses were repairable.  Thus, the peak overpressure required to damage this type of structure 
to a given extent is two to four times higher for a 1-ton conventional explosive than for a 30-kt nuclear explosive.  
This is because the blast wave from the nuclear explosion lasts much longer.  For example, the duration of the blast 
wave is nearly 1 second for a 30-kt nuclear explosion and a peak overpressure of 5 psi; for one ton of TNT and an 
overpressure of 20 psi it is only about 0.01 s.  Because the duration of the chemical blast is short compared to the 
natural period of the structure (which is roughly 0.2 s), increases in the duration (which is proportional to the cube 
root of the yield for a given overpressure) result in increased displacement and damage.  When the duration of the 
blast is longer than the natural period of the structure (as is the case with most nuclear explosions), damage 
becomes insensitive to duration and depends only on peak overpressure.  The observed ratio of 2-4:1 for the peak 
overpressures required to destroy these structures with chemical and nuclear explosives, respectively, is in accord 
with theoretical predictions.  See Kinney, Explosive Shocks in Air, pp. 142-144. 
    19 The 6:1 ratio of houses damaged to houses destroyed in London (see Table 2) is what one would expect from 
the roughly 2.5:1 ratio of the radii for "A" and "C" damage given in Table 4, since the area of destruction is 
proportional to the square of the damage radii. 
    20 O' Brien, Civil Defence, p. 655.  This was apparently the peak number of evacuees, at least during the V-1 
attacks.  Some of the evacuees subsequently returned to London before the missile attacks ended. 
    21 Longmate, The Doodlebugs, p. 261. 
    22 The London Civil Defense Region had an area of about 730 square miles, or 1,900 square kilometers.  





and "C" (seriously damaged but repairable) levels of structural damage, of 23, 31, and 57 meters, 
respectively.   
 
The Scud Attacks on Tehran 
 Only limited information is available on casualties and damage from the Iraqi Scud 
attacks on Tehran during the so-called "War of the Cities."  A total of 189 modified Scud-B 
missiles (dubbed the "al Hussein" by Iraq--the same missile used against Israel and Saudi Arabia) 
fell on six different Iranian cities from 29 February to 20 April 1988; 135 of these landed in 
Tehran.23  On 4 April, after about 125 missiles had fallen, Iranian sources reported that 1,150 
people had died and 4,000 had been injured from the missile attacks.24 However, some foreign 
analysts believe that Iran underestimated casualties to minimize civilian panic, and estimate that 
2,000 people died.25   
 If 1,150 people died, and if all of the Iranian cities attacked have roughly equal 
population densities, then as few as nine people were killed and 32 injured per missile impact in 
Tehran; if 2,000 died, then about 16 people were killed per missile impact in Tehran.  If the 
smaller cities had population densities significantly less than that of Tehran (or were small 
enough that a higher fraction of Scuds missed the city), the casualty rate in Tehran would be 
somewhat higher.   
 Assume for the moment that the circumstances of the Scud attacks on Tehran were 
similar to those of the V-2 attacks on London.  Under this assumption, we need only modify the 
casualty and damage rates for London to account for differences in population density and 
warhead yield in order to estimate the expected casualty rate in Tehran.   
 
Population density  
                                               
    23 W. Seth Carus and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet 
Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 6 (June 1990), pp. 242-248.  During the entire war, Iraq claims to have fired 331 
Scuds against Iran ("Iraqi Missile Declarations," Arms Control Today, November 1992, p. 28).  Iraq also fired 
many shorter range missiles at Iranian cities closer to its borders. 
    24 John Bierman, "A Battered City Under Siege," Maclean's, 18 April 1988, pp. 34-36.   





 In 1988, the Tehran metropolitan area had a population of about 8.6 million26 
concentrated in a relatively small area of 290 square kilometers,27 for a population density of 
about 30,000 per square km.  As in London, large-scale evacuation resulted from the missile 
attacks; some diplomats estimated that as many as two million people (nearly one-quarter of the 
population) left the city.28  If, for lack of better information, we assume the same fraction of 
evacuees as in London (about 20 percent), the population density of Tehran would have been 
about seven times greater than that of London during the missile attacks.  Therefore, all else 
being equal, the same type of warhead would on average kill and injure about seven times as 
many people if targeted against Tehran rather than London. 
 
Warhead yield 
 Iran claimed that the modified Scud used by the Iraqis carried a warhead containing 160 
to 190 kilograms of high explosives;29 in addition, the kinetic energy of the intact missile at 
impact would have been equivalent to about 400 kilograms of TNT.30  However, reports from 
Iran suggested that the missiles did not remain intact, but that the Scud's warhead separated from 
the booster prior to impact.31  Based on the Gulf War experience, it seems clear that these reports 
were actually referring to the breakup of the booster during reentry due to the instability of the 
modified missile.32  In this case, the total energy released on impact would have been less than the 
                                               
    26 The population of the Teheran metropolitan area was 7.52 million in 1985 and 9.38 million in 1990.  (John 
W. Wright, ed., The Universal Almanac 1990 (Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1990), p. 533.)  Assuming a 
constant rate of growth during this time, the population in 1988 would have been 8.6 million. 
    27 The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1992 (New York: Pharos Books, 1992), p. 821.  According to the 
accompanying text, "to the extent practical, non-residential areas such as parks, airports, industrial complexes and 
water were excluded from the area," so the population density estimated here may be somewhat too high. 
    28 Bierman, "A Battered City," p. 34. 
    29 Carus and Bermudez, "Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile Programme," p. 244. 
    30 Assuming a total mass of 1500 kilograms and a velocity of 1600 meters per second at impact. 
    31 Bierman, "A Battered City," p. 28. 
    32 At least some of the problems with the Iraqi-modified Scud missiles were known to the Iranians.  In March 
1988, Iranian Majlis speaker Rafsanjani publicly discussed the modifications the Iraqis had made to the basic Scud 





equivalent of 250 kilograms of TNT.  (Recall that the total energy released on impact by the V-2 
was equivalent to about 900 kilograms of TNT).  Since the area subjected to a given peak 
overpressure scales as the yield to the two-thirds power, assuming an energy release equivalent to 
250 kilograms of TNT, the lethal area created by the impact of the modified Scud (and therefore 
the expected number of casualties and houses destroyed) would be about 0.43 times that of the 
V-2.   
 Thus, scaling for differences in population density and warhead yield, one would have 
expected the casualty rate in Tehran to have been roughly three times greater than that in 
London, with 14 deaths and 35 serious injuries expected per Scud impact.  This estimate is in 
general agreement with the available information, albeit scarce and of unknown reliability, about 
casualties in Tehran.  However, it is difficult to draw any conclusions because there are relevant 
circumstances in Tehran that may have differed significantly from those in London, and about 
which we have inadequate information (for example, construction practices and civil defense -- 
see our subsequent discussion of construction practices in Israel). 
 
The Scud Attacks in Afghanistan 
 Beginning in October 1988, the Soviet-backed government of the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan (DRA) launched over 2,000 Scud missiles at positions held by Mujahideen 
guerrillas.33  Unlike the missile attacks on London and Tehran, many of these attacks were 
directed at military targets: Mujahideen formations, staging areas, ammunition dumps, and supply 
lines.  Because these relatively small targets are difficult to destroy with inaccurate missiles (the 
Scud-B is estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) of about 1 km)34 armed with 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
modifications had led to stability problems that could cause the missiles to "do somersaults" while outside the 
atmosphere.  He also claimed that the missiles had a number of additional problems which he did not wish to 
reveal to the Iraqis.  "2d Sermon on Missile Attacks," Daily Report - Near East and South Asia, Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (hereafter referred to as FBIS), March 14, 1988, pp. 59-62. 
    33 For information on missile attacks in Afghanistan see Joseph S. Bermudez, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third 
World - Afghanistan 1979-1992," Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1991, p. 51-58.  See also Anthony H. 
Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume III: the Afghan and Falkland Conflicts 
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 163-164. 
    34 Steven Zaloga, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Scud and Beyond," International Defense Review, 





conventional warheads, the attacks were militarily ineffective.  The attacks did, however, serve to 
terrorize villages that were captured by the Mujahideen or that were suspected of supporting the 
guerrillas.  For example, when the village of Khost was captured by the Mujahideen, four Scuds 
were fired by the DRA, killing 14 and wounding 30.  The most frequently cited attack is one in 
which two Scuds hit a crowded bazaar in Asadabad, reportedly killing 300 and wounding 500.35 
 The missiles used in these attacks were apparently unmodified Scud-Bs, with full-size 
(1000 kg) warheads.  While their poor accuracy has been noted above, they almost certainly were 
considerably more accurate than the modified Scuds used by Iraq against Iran, Israel, and Saudi 
Arabia.  It is also possible that larger, more accurate Scud-Cs (with a CEP estimated at 300 m)36 
were used in Afghanistan.   
 Unfortunately, very little detailed information is available about the number of attacks on 
civilian targets and the resulting casualties and damage in Afghanistan, and we are not able to 
determine if the casualties are consistent with what would be expected based on the London V-2 
experience.   
 
THE SCUD ATTACKS ON ISRAEL 
 The 39 modified Scud missiles that reached Israel directly killed two people and injured 
about 230 more.37  Almost all of the injuries were light, with only ten classified as moderate and 
one as severe.  The number of Israeli deaths and serious injuries produced by the modified Scud 
missiles at first glance seems remarkably low compared with previous ballistic missile attacks.  In 
fact, the total number of direct deaths and serious injuries in Israel was less than that caused by 
just one average missile impact in London or Tehran.38   
                                                                                                                                                                                  
inside of which half the impacts would occur.  The actual impact patterns of ballistic missiles are typically 
elliptical rather than circular, however, with the range error generally being larger than the cross-range (or track) 
error. 
    35 Bermudez, p. 52. 
    36 Cordesman and Wagner, p. 164. 
    37 Casualty statistics are given in Eric Karsenty, Joshua Shemer, Itzhik Alshech, Bruno Cojocaru, Marian 
Moscovitz, Yair Shapiro, Yehuda L. Danon, "Medical Aspects of the Iraqi Missile Attacks on Israel," Israel 
Journal of Medical Sciences, Vol. 27 (November-December, 1991), pp. 603-607; and Avi Bleich, Anat Dycian, 





 Most of the casualties and damage in Israel occurred in the Tel Aviv area.  As discussed 
above, it is necessary to account for differences in population density and warhead yield when 
estimating the expected casualty rate.  The Tel Aviv metropolitan area had a population density 
of about 7,000 per km2 in 1991.39  As was the case in London and Tehran, many people left Tel 
Aviv during the missile attacks.  One study of Israeli casualties cites this as a factor in reducing 
casualties, noting that "quite a number of the badly damaged homes were in fact empty at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Civilian Population: Israeli Lessons from the Persian Gulf War," Journal of the American Medical Association, 
Vol. 268, No. 5 (5 August 1992), p. 613-615.  These two studies differ only marginally in the total number of 
direct casualties cited (234 and 231 respectively). 
     Many reports cite only one, rather than two, direct deaths.  This discrepancy arises from the third attack on 
Israel, when a single Scud hit the Tel Aviv suburb of Ramat Gan on the evening of 22 January and three people 
died.  Initial reports attributed all three deaths to heart attacks (and this is what was widely reported afterwards), 
but one of these deaths was a direct result of the Scud attack: "It should be noted that heart attack was not the cause 
of death in all three cases, as reported earlier.  The dead woman who was taken to Ichilov Hospital died of crushing 
wounds as a result of the explosion.  The two other dead women suffered heart attacks as a result of the missile 
impact."  Jerusalem Voice of Israel and IDF Radio Network, 4:20 am [Israel Time], 23 January 1991, in FBIS, 
Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, 23 January 1991, p. 28. 
     The other death was a man killed (also in Ramat Gan) in the fifth attack, on the evening of Friday, 25 January, 
apparently from a head wound.  "Brig. Gen. Yehuda Danon, chief medical officer of the Israeli Defense Forces, 
said one death resulted from a direct hit on a house Friday night and the other was a woman who was crushed by 
debris and cut by shattered glass."  The latter is the death described in the preceding paragraph.  William 
Claiborne and Jackson Diehl, "Patriots Launched to Meet New Scud Attack Over Israel," Washington Post, 27 
January 1991, p. A22. 
 In addition to the direct casualties, there were also a large number of indirect casualties in Israel.  Seven 
people suffocated due to improper use of gas masks and five fatal heart attacks were attributed to the missile 
attacks.  Another 815 indirect casualties were treated at hospitals and can be attributed to the Scud attacks.  These 
were primarily cases of people with acute anxiety or who had injected themselves with the atropine provided in 
their civil defense kits.  More than half of the indirect injuries were not due to actual missile attacks but to the five 
false alarms that occurred during the first few days of the attacks.  Karsenty, et. al., "Medical Aspects." 
    38 It is the direct casualty figures that are generally mentioned in discussions of casualties in Israel, and we 
assume the casualty figures cited for London and Teheran are also for direct casualties.  It is worth noting that the 
number of indirect casualties per Scud attack on Israel declined rapidly as the war  progressed.  Sixty four percent 
of the anxiety reactions and atropine injection cases requiring hospitalization in Israel occurred in the first day of 
the attacks and another 15% were due to the second attack (Bleich, et. al., "Psychiatric Implications," p. 614).  On 
the other hand, London had been subjected to bombing for several years prior to the V-1 and V-2 attacks. 
    39 The population density of the metropolitan Tel Aviv area was 5,910 per km2 in 1983 (Atlas of Israel: 
Cartography, Physical and Human Geometry (New York: MacMillan, 1985), map 23.).  Between 1985 and 1990, 
the Israeli population increased at a rate of 1.66 percent per year; between 1960 and 1990, the percentage of the 
Israeli population living in the Tel Aviv area increased from 34.9 to 40.9 percent (World Resources Institute, 
World Resources 1992-93 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 247, 265.).  Assuming constant growth 





time of explosion."40  Although this evacuation was widely noted in the press, its extent is difficult 
to estimate, especially since many of the evacuees left only at night, returning to their jobs in the 
morning.41  In the absence of better information, we assume the same fraction of evacuees as in 
London (about 20%), which would give a population density of about 5,700 per km2 for the Tel 
Aviv metropolitan area during the missile attacks--about 1.6 times that of London.   
 The Iraqi-modified Scud missile (the al-Hussein) used against Israel was apparently the 
same as that used against Iran, and it appears that essentially all of the missiles launched by Iraq 
during the 1991 Gulf War broke up on reentry.  Thus as with the Iraqi attacks on Tehran, we 
assume that the total energy released on impact was equivalent to 250 kilograms of TNT.42  
Recall that the total energy released by a V-2 impact was equivalent to 900 lbs of TNT.  Thus, 
taking into account the differences in population density and warhead yield by applying the 
appropriate scaling factors to the casualty rates from V-2 attacks on London, the expected 
casualty rates are about 3.3 deaths, 8.1 serious injuries, and 18 slight injuries per Scud impact in 
Tel Aviv.  This would lead to 129 expected deaths, 316 serious injuries, and and 702 slight 
injuries from the 39 missiles that struck Israel, assuming that all the missiles fell into a 
metropolitan area similar to Tel Aviv.  Thus, the actual number of direct deaths (two) that 
resulted from the Scud attacks was more than sixty times less than what one might have expected 
based on this very simple extrapolation from the V-2 experience in London.  Similarly, the 
number of serious injuries (11) was roughly 30 times smaller, and the number of light injuries 
(220) more than 3 times smaller than would have been expected based on the V-2 data.  
However, as we discuss below, there are a number of factors that can account for most or all of 
these apparent discrepancies. 
                                               
    40 Karsenty, et. al., "Medical Aspects," p. 606. 
    41 The daily exodus from Tel Aviv resulted in massive traffic jams.  (Judy Siegal, "Gridlock, Tel Aviv Style," 
Jerusalem Post, January 28, 1991, p. 2; and Michal Yudelman, "Coping with the Indignities of Life," Jerusalem 
Post, January 25, 1991, p. 2).  This daily evacuation occurred because the Israeli population understood that 
Coalition air power was forcing Iraq to launch after dark.  The only daytime attack on Israel was the second one, 
which occurred at 7:15 am on 19 January. 
    42 Since Tel Aviv and Haifa are 50 to 100 kilometers closer to Iraqi launch sites than Teheran, Iraq could have 
armed the missiles launched at Israel with slightly heavier warheads.  It is quite likely, however, that the same 






THE ROLE OF PATRIOT   
 The Scud attacks on Israel began early in the morning of 18 January, 1991, but the first 
Patriot battery did not become operational in Israel until after 12 Scuds had already fallen.  Of 
the 39 Scuds that reached Israel, 27 were fired after Patriot was operational; of these, 17 were 
engaged by Patriot missiles.43  Most or all of the other ten Iraqi missiles apparently fell in areas not 
covered by the Patriot batteries, which were deployed in the Tel Aviv and Haifa areas,44 and 
produced few casualties and no significant damage.45 
 According to the U.S. Army's most recently revised estimates of Patriot effectiveness, of 
the 17 engagements in Israel, only 40 percent were successful.46  Furthermore, the Army stated 
that it had "highest" confidence in only 40 percent of the claimed successful engagements in Israel 
and Saudi Arabia.47  Thus, of the 17 Scuds engaged in Israel, the U.S. Army credits Patriot with 
at most seven successful intercepts, with only about three of these being in the "highest" 
confidence category (assuming equal confidence levels in Israel and Saudi Arabia).  Moreover, as 
we shall discuss subsequently, six Scuds fell in areas defended by Patriot before it was operational. 
 Thus even using the Army's data, Patriot would have been expected to reduce the casualty rate 
by no more than 13 to 30 percent.48  Moreover, there are reasons to believe that the Army's 
                                               
    43 Eric Schmidt, "Israel Plays Down Effectiveness of Patriot Missile," New York Times (International edition), 
31 October 1991, p. A8; and Ethan Bronner and John Aloysius Farrell, "US, Israeli Experts Dispute Patriot 
Claims," Boston Globe, 19 March 1992, p. 1. 
    44 There were two Patriot batteries in Haifa and four at Tel Aviv.  In addition, a Dutch battery arrived towards 
near the end of the war and was deployed near Jerusalem, however, it did not engage any Scuds. 
    45 Bleich, et. al., "Psychiatric Implications," p. 614, indicate that two people were injured on 25 February.  The 
two Scuds fired at Israel that day fell in the Negev desert, well out of the range of Patriot batteries in Tel Aviv. 
    46 U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Data Does Not Exist to Conclusively Say How 
Well Patriot Performed, GAO/NSIAD-92-340, September 1992, p. 3. 
    47 The assignment of an engagement as a high confidence successful intercept does not mean that the Army is 
claiming that it is certain that the engagement was successful.  "According to the Deputy Project Manager, the 
assignment of a high confidence level to an engagement's outcome did not mean that the Army was absolutely 
confident that the assessed outcome was correct.  Rather, given the limited data available for assessment purposes, 
the Army scorers had higher confidence in the assessed outcome of these engagements than in others."  U.S. 
General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Data Does Not Exist, p. 3. 





claimed Patriot success rate is too high.49  In addition, any damage prevented by successful 
intercepts must be weighed against the damage caused by the at least four Patriot missiles that 
struck the ground and exploded in Israel.50  Finally, debris from Patriots that detonated above 
cities or from intercepted Scuds may have caused some damage.51  Due to the lack of accurate 
track data on the Scud and Patriot missiles, the effect of Patriot in mitigating casualties and 
damage in Israel will never be known with any certainty.  Since large statistical fluctuations 
would be expected in the damage caused by small numbers of inaccurate ballistic missiles armed 
with conventional warheads, any effect that Patriot may have had on casualties and damage in 
this case is lost in the noise. 
 Casualty and damage statistics support this conclusion.  Of the 231 direct casualties, 52 
occurred before Patriot was operational (4.3 per Scud) and 179 after (6.6 per Scud).52  All but 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of Scuds reaching Israel (39) should not be used in this calculation because Scuds that fell outside of defended 
areas were much less likely to cause casualties. 
    49 See Conyers, "The Patriot Myth".  A recent report by the U.S. General Accounting Office concluded that only 
about 9 percent of the Patriot engagements are supported by "highest" confidence data indicating a successful 
intercept.  U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Data Does Not Exist. 
   In addition, there is a substantial body of evidence in the form of news media videos of Patriot 
engagements that suggest that its success rate was much lower than the current U.S. Army claims.  See George N. 
Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, An Evaluation of the Army Report "Analysis of Video Tapes to Assess Patriot 
Effectiveness," Dated 31 March 1992: A Study Performed in Response to a Request by Congressman John 
Conyers, Jr., Chairman of the House Government Operations Committee (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Defense and 
Arms Control Studies Program, September 1992). 
    50 The U.S. Army and Raytheon acknowledge that some Patriots dove into the ground, although the exact 
number remains classified.  Publicly available news media videos show at least three Patriots diving into the 
ground in Israel on the night of January 25; two of these were in Tel Aviv and one was in Haifa (Lewis and Postol, 
"An Evaluation of the Army Report," p. 61).  At least three Patriots reportedly dove into the ground in Tel Aviv on 
this night, with two of them striking residential neighborhoods (Fred Kaplan, "Specialists Debate the Value of 
Patriot, Boston Globe, 5 May 1991, p. 1).  Charles Zraket (Zraket, "Patriot Gave Stellar Gulf Performance") states 
that four Patriots hit the ground in Israel (however, Zraket also incorrectly says that no Patriots dove into the 
ground in Saudi Arabia).  More recently, in interviews conducted by Reuven Pedatzur and Theodore Postol, three 
Israeli experts gave figures of 8, 9, and 11 for the number of Patriots that dove into the ground in Israel. 
    51 The Patriot intercept attempts together with the Scud breakups must have generated a considerable amount of 
falling debris.  Such debris would have been greatly slowed up by the atmosphere, greatly reducing its damage-
producing potential.  Most Israelis were indoors during the attacks, and thereby had a considerable degree of 
protection from such debris.  Nevertheless debris undoubtably caused some damage to buildings, most of it 
probably light, and appears to have caused at least a few injuries.  






two of the 179 casualties that occured after Patriot was operational were caused by Scuds that 
were apparently engaged by Patriot.  Moreover, both direct deaths occurred during the period of 
Patriot defense, and press reports suggest that most or all of the injuries that occurred before the 
Patriot deployment were light. 
 The situation with respect to property damage is more complicated.  The Tel Aviv news-
paper Ma'ariv compiled a list of damage to buildings that indicated 2,797 apartments suffered 
damage before (233 per Scud) and 9,029 after Patriot was operational (334 per Scud).53  
However, much of the damage to apartments was very light (e.g., broken windows).  If only 
apartments that were seriously damaged or destroyed are counted, the figures are 37 per Scud 
before, and 34 per Scud after the deployment of Patriot.54   Unfortunately, no definitive studies of 
damage comparable to those on casualties appear to be available. 
 Thus while serious damage to apartments per Scud appears to have decreased slightly 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 To calculate casualties on a per missile basis, we assume 12 Scuds before Patriot and 27 afterwards.  In 
these calculations, we have included all the Scuds that struck in or near Israel.  An argument could be made that 
the ten Scuds that were not engaged after Patriot was operational should be excluded, because most or all of them 
presumably fell outside the Patriot's defended perimeter and thus almost certainly fell in areas of much lower 
population density.  However, this has not been done because we are unable to make the corresponding 
determination of how many of the Scuds launched before Patriot would have been outside of the defended 
perimeter.  A better argument can be made that the three Scuds apparently fired at Dimona should be excluded; 
however, to be conservative, we have included these as well (excluding them would slightly increase the per 
missile damage and casualties after Patriot). 
    53 Translated and reproduced in Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience," pp. 141-144. 
    54 The interpretation of the Ma'ariv statistics has been a subject of dispute.  Light damage is generally conceded 
to be greater after Patriot activation, but the situation for heavy damage has been disputed.  Postol excludes from 
his count those Scuds which Ma'ariv lists as not falling in the Tel Aviv or Haifa Metropolitan area and which 
caused no damage, and finds that heavy damage per Scud was greater after Patriot.  (Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf 
War.")  This is not entirely satisfactory because the number of Scuds falling in metropolitan areas is not broken 
down for the four multiple missile attacks, which account for almost 60% of the Scuds reaching Israel, including 
all of those before Patriot was operational.  Thus it is possible that some of the Scuds launched before the 
deployment of Patriot also did not fall in a metropolitan area, and should also be excluded, thereby giving a higher 
damage rate before Patriot was operational. 
 Stein, in his rebuttal to Postol, argues that very few Scuds fell on Tel Aviv before Patriot, and that the 
heavy damage per Scud was greater before Patriot.  (Stein, "Patriot Experience in the Gulf War," p. 222). This 
conclusion follows from his statement, presumably based on classified data, that more than twice as many Scuds 
fell on Tel Aviv after Patriot than hit before Patriot.  However, Stein's acknowledgement that the light damage in 
Tel Aviv was greater after Patriot indicates that fewer than three times as many Scuds fell after Patriot deployment 
than before Patriot.  This indicates that even with Stein's figures on the numbers of Scuds before and after Patriot, 
that the casualties per Scud were still greater after Patriot if one uses the casualty figures cited in this paper (which 





after Patriot became operational, light damage, deaths, and injuries all increased.  Given the small 
number of Scud impacts in inhabited areas, however, the differences before and after Patriot are 
not statistically significant.  The only conclusion suggested by the available data is that Patriot 
had relatively little effect on casualties or damage. 
 
 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO LIMITING CASUALTIES IN ISRAEL 
 The role that the small size of the modified Scud warheads and the breakup of the Scud 
missiles played in reducing the explosive yield and kinetic energy of the Scuds has already been 
described in the section "Scud Attacks on Tehran."  There are a number of additional factors that 
could have played a significant role in limiting the casualties from the Scud attacks on Israel. 
 
Inaccuracy of the Modified Scuds   
 A crucial factor in limiting the damage to Israel was that the modified Scud missiles were 
so inaccurate that many of them did not strike populated areas.55  According to a study of Israeli 
casualties, only six Scud warhead explosions caused direct casualties.56  
 As previously noted, the basic Scud-B, at its maximum range of 300 kilometers, is so 
inaccurate that half of the impacts would be more than one kilometer from the target.  Moreover, 
the modifications made to the missile by Iraq decreased its accuracy even further, because the 
range of the missile was roughly doubled and the missile tumbled and broke up on reentry.57  The 
                                               
    55 Three of the Scuds, however, were apparently not fired at cities but at the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona.  
All three apparently fell in the surrounding desert. 
    56 Karsenty, et. al., "Medical Implications," pp. 604-605.  This figure is not inconsistent more than 6 warheads 
detonating within cities, since some fell in nonresidential areas that would have been deserted at the time of the 
attack.  In addition, it appears that two other attacks besides these six caused a few casualties, perhaps from falling 
debris.  See the table in Bleich et. al., "Psychiatric Implications," p. 614. 
    57 Since the CEP is roughly proportional to the range, the operational CEP of the al Hussein would be doubled 
simply due to the range extension.  The breakup of the missile would also decrease its accuracy by altering its 
ballistic coefficient, thereby changing its reentry aerodynamics and its range in an unpredictable manner.  Indeed, 
in 1988, an Iranian official said that the modifications to the Scud made it "not precise," and that the missile was 
three times less accurate than the Iranian Scud-Bs  ("Rafiquist, Kharrazi Discuss War of Cities," FBIS, 11 March 





Scud-hunting campaign carried out by Coalition aircraft also may have significantly reduced the 
accuracy of the Scuds by causing the Iraqi launch crews to rush their setup and alignment 
procedures and to launch Scuds from locations that had not been surveyed in advance. 
 It is difficult to determine the exact number of Scud impacts in Israeli metropolitan 
areas.58  To avoid giving useful targeting information to Iraq, Israeli censorship regulations did 
not allow the release of the precise locations of Scud impacts, and did not allow the reporting of 
impacts in the Mediterranean Sea.  After the first two weeks of the missile attacks, Israel also 
stopped reporting whether or not Patriots were fired at particular Scuds.  In addition, the breakup 
of the Scuds, Patriot intercept attempts, and Patriot ground impacts caused debris to be scattered 
over a wide area.59  Thus, even an attack by a single Scud could result in widespread damage, 
making it more difficult to determine from news reports the location of the warhead impact or 
even if there was a warhead impact.60 
 Nevertheless it is possible to sort out much of what must have happened in the attacks in 
Israel.  A chronology of the Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia is given in the Appendix.   
 In attacks involving a single Scud missile to a given area, there is little difficulty in 
                                               
    58  The metropolitan area we consider here is the area shown as having a 1983 population density of 5,910/km2 
in Atlas of Israel, map 23.  This area of about 200 km2 is approximately a 10-by-20-km rectangle, with its long 
side parallel to the Mediterranean coast.  Thus we take any Scud falling near Tel Aviv and within 10 km of the 
coast as having fallen in the metropolitan area.  (One Scud landed approximately 10 km from the coast on 
February 12; it caused casualties and damage, so we count it as falling in the metropolitan area).  For Haifa, the 
geographic situation is more complicated.  However, it appears that only one warhead exploded in the Haifa 
metropolitan area. 
    59 See Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War," pp. 148-149, for figures illustrating the possible extent of debris 
scattering.  The breakups of Scuds often led to the double-counting of Scud impacts in Teheran (FBIS, 11 March 
1988, p. 67). 
    60 There is, however, a enormous difference between the effects of falling debris and a high-explosive warhead.  
Relatively small, dense pieces of debris could potentially penetrate several floors of a building.  At least one person 
in Israel was injured by being directly struck by missile debris, when a missile motor crashed through his ceiling 
(Karsenty, et. al., "Medical Aspects," p. 606.), and some injuries also may have resulted from flying glass, etc. 
produced by falling debris.  Less dense pieces of debris, which were much more common, would fall more slowly 
and would only be dangerous to people caught outside.  Thus, the timing of the attacks and the few minutes of 
warning may have been important in reducing casualties from debris.  Unlike debris, a high-explosive warhead 
produces intense destruction in a relatively localized area.  The blast wave generated by the explosion can knock 
down walls and destroy nearby buildings, and can shatter windows over a much greater distance.  Any small 
building directly hit by such a warhead would be completely destroyed.  If the warhead explodes on or near the 
surface, a crater will be produced.  Thus, there should be little difficulty in distinguishing between the explosion of 





identifying the cases in which a warhead detonated in a populated area.  In the fifteen single-
Scud attacks, only three warheads appear to have exploded in populated areas in or near Tel 
Aviv or Haifa.61  The other twelve warheads fell in uninhabited areas, were duds, or possibly were 
destroyed by Patriot missiles.62 
 It is more difficult to sort out what occurred in the four multiple-Scud attacks in which 
eight, four, seven, and five missiles, respectively, were fired at Tel Aviv and Haifa.63  The first two 
attacks occurred before Patriot was operational.  Eight missiles were fired at Tel Aviv and Haifa 
at about 2 am on 18 January, and four missiles were fired at Tel Aviv at about 7 am on the 
following day.  Stein states that the majority of these missiles "were not on target, and only very 
few fell on Tel Aviv."64  Taken literally, this means that no more than five Scuds were on target; 
and as we shall see, at least one of these did not explode.  A Pentagon briefing on 25 January 
1991 also implied that no more than five or six of these missiles landed in populated areas and 
caused damage.65  As discussed in the Appendix, we have been able to identify six Scud warhead 
                                               
    61 These attacks occurred on 22 January, 9 February, and 12 February 1991.  See the Appendix for details. 
    62 It is possible that some of these Scuds landed in areas, that although uninhabited, were still in a metropolitan 
area. The Scud fired at Haifa on the evening of 23 January was the only one of these twelve not reported by the 
Israeli government or press to have landing in an uninhabited area.  This was also the only one of these twelve 
Scuds reported as causing damage, but the damage (primarily broken windows) was attributed to debris falling 
over a wide area, which might well have been caused by debris from the breakup of the Scud or from the Patriots 
that were fired at the Scud.  There were no injuries and no reports that suggested a warhead impact.  Joel Brinkley, 
"No Immediate Retaliation, Israelis Say," New York Times (International Edition), January 24, p. A15; and Jackson 
Diehl and William Claiborne, "Patriot Battery in Israel Intercepts Iraqi Missile," Washington Post, January 24, p. 
1. 
    63 Even the number of missiles fired in each of these attacks is somewhat uncertain, as the various data sources 
for these numbers are not always in agreement.  The numbers used here represent our best estimate based on 
currently available information. 
    64 Stein, "Patriot Experience in the Gulf War," p. 222. 
    65 According to Gen. Thomas Kelly, "Up until today [January 25]...34 Scuds had been launched against Saudi 
Arabia and Israel -- 21 against Saudi Arabia, 13 against Israel.  Eighteen of them were destroyed by Patriots, nine 
landed in uninhabited areas or in the sea.  Of the remaining seven, to one degree or another they impacted the 
earth and caused some damage."  Pete Williams, Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly, and Capt. David Herrington, Pentagon 
Briefing, 3:30 pm, Jan. 25, 1991 in Steven A. Hildreth, Evaluation of U.S. Army Assessment of Patriot Antitactical 
Missile Effectiveness in the War Against Iraq, report prepared for the House Government Operations 
Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, 7 April 1992, p. 31. 
 At this point, only two of the thirteen Scuds that had reached Israel were fired after Patriot was 





impacts (one warhead did not explode) in populated areas in these first two attacks. 
 The other two multi-Scud attacks occurred during the period of Patriot defense: seven 
Scuds were launched at Tel Aviv and Haifa on 25 January and five the next day.  In neither 
attack were there reports of explosions in populated areas near Haifa.  In the first of these two 
attacks, we have so far been able to clearly identify only two explosion sites in populated areas in 
or near Tel Aviv.  In addition, at least three Patriots dove into the ground and exploded in or 
near Tel Aviv on this night.66  There were also reports of damage from falling debris.  In the 
second attack, a Scud is known to have exploded on a deserted beach north of downtown Tel 
Aviv. 
 From press reports, it is possible to identify about ten or eleven Scud warheads that 
exploded in populated areas in Israel.  Interviews conducted by Reuven Pedatzur in Israel have 
established a number of additional Scud warhead impact sites and have allowed us to construct 
the map shown in figure 1.  This shows the impact location of 17 Scuds that fell in the general 
vicinity of Tel Aviv.67  Three of the Scud warheads (numbers 3, 7, and 13 on the map) did not 
explode.  Two others (numbers 15 and 17) are outside our defined Tel Aviv metropolitan area 
(that is, they are more than 10 km from the coast).  Thus about 13 warheads exploded on the 
ground in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.  Since one additional warhead is known to have 
exploded in the Haifa metropolitan area, it appears that a total of 14 Scuds exploded in Israeli 
metropolitan areas. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
intercept.  Even assuming that none of the Scuds in Saudi Arabia caused any damage (although one of the earlier 
attacks did cause damage and injuries in Riyadh), this means that no more than six Scuds impacted the ground in 
inhabited areas in the January 18 and 19 attacks on Israel. 
    66 Although no reports specifically attributed damage to Patriots diving into the ground, it is clear that most or 
all of the incidents of Patriots diving into the ground in Israel occurred on the night of 25 January. 
    67 This map is based on the best information available to us at the time of publication.  Some of the impact 
points, in particular those for which no date is given, are somewhat uncertain.  It is likely that most of tthe impact 





 What happened to the other Scuds?  Of the 39 Scuds, three were fired at Dimona and 
landed harmlessly in the desert.  Roughly six others were fired at Haifa; most of these probably 
landed in the Mediterranean.  Roughly 30 Scuds were fired towards Tel Aviv; 17 are shown on 
figure 1 and another four apparently landed in the West Bank.  It seems likely that many of the 
remaining Scuds landed in the Mediterranean.  An anonymous senior Pentagon scientist 
reportedly stated that Scuds not engaged by Patriot "either fell in the sea or out of range of the 
Patriot batteries, near towns in the West Bank or in the Negev desert."68  One the Israeli casualty 
studies noted that of the missiles launched against Israel, "a number fell in the sea or exploded in 
the air."69  It is also possible that a few Scuds were destroyed by Patriots. 
 Finally, it is interesting to see if the available data can tell us anything about the CEP of 
the modified Scuds.  First, however, it is important to note that the concept of CEP may not be 
truly applicable to the entire set of Scud attacks on Israel.  This is because the accuracy of the 
Scuds may have changed as the war progressed.  The general pattern of the Scud attacks on Israel 
suggest that the accuracy of the Scuds may have decreased dramatically towards the end of the 
war. 
 In the first two attacks, before Patriot was operational, 12 Scuds were fired at Tel Aviv 
and Haifa.  One landed in Haifa and five near Tel Aviv.  Four of the five Tel Aviv impacts (one 
of which did not explode) were within the Tel Aviv-Jaffa city limits.  It seems quite probable that 
most or all of the other Scuds landed in the Mediterranean. 
 The next 14 Scuds fired at Tel Aviv and Haifa came in four attacks over five days after 
Patriot was operational.  It appears that about 11 or 12 of these were engaged by Patriot.70  
However, this tells us relatively little about the CEP because the area defended by Patriot was 
quite large. 
 The accuracy of the last ten Scuds fired at Tel Aviv and Haifa (we exclude the three 
apparently fired at Dimona) appears to be significantly poorer than that of the earlier Scuds.  
                                               
    68 Schmidt, "Israel Plays Down Effectiveness," p. A8. 
    69 Karsenty, et. al., "Medical Aspects," p. 604. 
    70 This assumes that the figure of 17 total engagements in Israel is correct.  There were at least 5, and possibly 





Only five or possibly six of these last ten Scuds were engaged.  Four Scuds landed far short of Tel 
Aviv in the West Bank.  Even two of the Scuds that were engaged landed well east of downtown 
Tel Aviv (these are the Scuds that hit on February 12 and February 19 -- numbers 10 and 3 on 
figure 1).  This strong eastward shift of the impact points strongly suggests a change in the nature 
of the Scud or a change in the way it was being launched. 
 Thus the available information strongly suggests that, at least towards the end of the war, 
the accuracy of the Scuds declined greatly.  This is not surprising given the vigorous Coalition air 
campaign against the Scud launchers. 
 The other major problem in attempting to assess the Scud's CEP is that many of the 
impact points are not yet known and none of the Scud aimpoints are known (we do not know if 
all the Scuds fired at a given metropolitan area had the same target).  It appears that there were 
about 30 Scuds fired at Tel Aviv.   We know the exact or approximate impact point of 17 of 
these and we know four others landed somewhere in the West Bank.  So this leaves us with about 
9 "missing" Scuds -- about half before Patriot deployment and half afterwards. 
 These missing Scuds would not necessarily be a problem in estimating the CEP if it could 
be assumed that their geographic distribution was similar to that of the Scuds whose impact point 
is known.   However, such an assumption would clearly be incorrect in this case.  The absence of 
news media reports on these missing Scuds suggests that many of them may have fallen in remote 
areas.  Most importantly, Tel Aviv and Haifa are coastal cities, so some Scuds would be expected 
to fall into the Mediterranean -- and wartime Israeli censorship rules forbade reporting of Scuds 
that fell into the Mediterranean.  Thus it appears likely that many of the "missing" Scuds fell into 
the Mediterranean. 
 Without knowing how many Scuds fell into the Mediterranean, no meaningful 
conclusions about the CEP of the Scuds can be drawn.  If we assume that most or all of the 
missing Scuds landed in the Mediterranean and were relatively close to shore, and we exclude the 
last 13 Scuds fired at Israel, then the data might support a CEP of about 4 kilometers.  If many of 
the missing Scuds landed outside the metropolitan area and we include all the Scuds fired late in 
the war, the data suggest a larger CEP -- but no greater than about 7 kilometers.   At present, the 
available data is simply inadequate to allow a reliable CEP estimate to be made.  However, in any 







 A major difference between the V-2 attacks on London and the Scud attacks on Tel Aviv 
was that the Israeli population generally had a few minutes warning time in which to take cover, 
because the United States shared satellite information on missile launches with Israel.71  We can 
account for this very approximately by comparing the casualty rate for the V-1 attacks, for which 
there was some warning, with that for the V-2 attacks, for which there was no warning.  After 
correcting for its slightly smaller yield, the death rate from V-1 attacks was 0.50 times that from 
the V-2 attacks.72  The corresponding ratios for serious injuries and light injuries were 0.58 and 
0.35, respectively.  Thus, taking into account warning time in addition to population density and 
warhead yield, the expected casualty rates in Tel Aviv are reduced to about 1.6 deaths, 4.7 
serious injuries, and 6.2 slight injuries per missile impact. 
 Another factor that may have played a role in reducing casualties is that virtually all of 
the missile attacks occurred at night, whereas the attacks on London and Tehran occurred 
throughout the day.73  Thus, most people were at home during the attacks, and on hearing the 
warnings simply had to go into interior rooms to obtain a degree of shelter, as they were 
instructed to do by the Israeli government.74    
  
Blast-resistant dwellings 
                                               
    71 However, in the first two attacks on Israel, the population had at most only a few seconds of warning time. 
    72 The Strategic Bombing Survey also attributed the lower death rate from V-1s to the more intense 
disintegration of debris produced by V-2 explosions, but, as discussed earlier, this was not a decisive factor.  In any 
case, apparently due to the much lower yield of the al Hussein and the reinforced-concrete construction of Israeli 
apartment buildings, such intense disintegration did not appear to occur from the impact of the modified Scud 
missiles in Israel.  Video of damage scenes show relatively coarse debris at Scud detonation sites, and there were 
several instances of people being dug out relatively unharmed from beneath destroyed buildings.  Moreover, both 
deaths in Israel were reportedly instantaneous (Karsenty, et. al., "Medical Aspects," p. 604).  
    73 A 1944 British study, based on a number of the first V-1 attacks, estimated that nighttime attacks would cause 
only half as many casualties as daytime attacks.  Dunn, The Emergency Medical Services, p. 171. 
    74 While these rooms might not have been as effective as underground blast shelters, victims of V-1 attacks had 
little time to get into such shelters if they waited (as many did), for the sound of the V-1 engine sound to stop 8 to 





 One Israeli study of the Scud casualties concluded that the most important factor in 
reducing casualties was the construction practices used in modern Israeli apartment buildings.75  
The multi-story apartment buildings erected in Tel Aviv over the last 30 years are constructed 
with reinforced concrete columns, beams, and floors.76  The reinforced concrete elements 
apparently prevented buildings close to Scud detonations from collapsing and burying their 
inhabitants.77  Even when the external unreinforced masonry block walls were destroyed, as long 
as the buildings did not collapse, the occupants were generally not seriously injured.78  On the 
other hand, in the few cases in which missiles struck near single-family houses or older, 
unreinforced masonry buildings, the buildings were often completely demolished, with the roof 
and walls collapsing. 
 In contrast, the typical London dwelling was the brick row house, which, because its walls 
were load-bearing, readily collapsed when explosions occured nearby.  The limited data available 
on the effects of V-2 missiles on reinforced concrete buildings indicates that the area of structural 
damage was roughly eight times smaller than for brick row houses.79  Since deaths and serious 
injuries were due primarily to structural collapses, significantly decreased rate of deaths and 
                                               
    75 Karsenty, et. al., "Medical Aspects," p. 606. 
    76 David Rudge, "Keeping Those Buildings Up," Jerusalem Post, 22 February 1991, p. 8; Karsenty, et. al., 
"Medical Aspects," p. 606. 
    77 According to Ya'acov Gluck, a Professor of Structural Engineering at Israel's Technion University: "Our 
buildings, as a whole, have stood up well against the blast effects.  We have seen very few total collapses except in 
the case of direct hits or incidents relating to old buildings or those not constructed in accordance with modern 
standards."  He went on to say that they had been ". . . pleasantly surprised by the ability of buildings to withstand 
the shockwaves from explosions.  It is very fortunate, otherwise we would have had a catastrophe with far more 
casualties."  Rudge, "Keeping those Buildings Up." 
    78 According to Professor Gluck, when this occurred, "there would normally be limited effects in inhabitants.  
People in the vicinity of the walls and windows would be injured, but not seriously."  According to Gluck, the 
majority of injuries were from this type of incident.  Rudge, "Keeping those Buildings Up." 
 Israeli doctors noted the same effect: "When the buildings involved were of the multi-level type - i.e., 
apartment blocks constructed of concrete with a steel girder shell and deep foundations - the injuries were mainly 
superficial, resulting from glass splinters or building fragments."  Karsenty, et. al, "Medical Aspects, p. 605. 
    79 Strategic Bombing Survey, V-Weapons in London, p. 22, gives a total floor demolition area of 94 m2 for 
reinforced concrete buildings, compared with 740 m2 for similar-sized buildings with load-bearing walls (740/94 = 
8).  Moreover, the mean distance from the warhead explosion at which walls were demolished was 11 m for 






serious injuries would be expected for reinforced concrete buildings compared with brick load-
bearing buildings. 
 It is important to note that the buildings in Tehran during the War of the Cities were 
generally similar to those in Tel Aviv.  While the traditional architecture in Tehran features 
buildings made of mud bricks, most of the buildings in modern day Tehran are constructed with 
steel skeletons and walls that are not load-bearing.  Tehran is in an earthquake zone and for the 
last few decades, has had strict building codes based on those for San Francisco.80  Moreover, 
most of the buildings in Tehran are relatively new: the population of Tehran roughly doubled in 
the decade 1978-88.  As a consequence, by the 1986 census roughly 12% of the residential units 
in Tehran were steel or reinforced-concrete structures, and an additional 80% were constructed 
of brick and steel or stone and steel, where the underlying load-bearing structure is steel and the 
outer walls are covered by a cladding of brick or stone.81  Presumably a similar fraction of 
commercial and other buildings were constructed with load-bearing steel substructures.   
 Recall that after adjusting for warhead yield and population density, the expected casualty 
rate in Tehran roughly agreed with that in London.  However, since the construction found in 
Tehran in 1988 was quite similar to that in present-day Tel Aviv and quite different from that in 
World War II London, we might expect the deaths and injuries (adjusted for warhead yield and 
population density) in Tehran to have been reduced relative to those in London.  On the other 
hand, the civil defense benefits of such construction are realized only if people are inside.  Thus, 
advance warning of an attack and the time of attack are also critical factors.  In contrast to the 
situation in Israel, no warning was available in Tehran and the attacks took place during both 
day and night.  It therefore seems likely that the benefits of the steel reinforced building 
construction in Tehran were not fully realized because there was no warning and the attacks took 
place when people were not necessarily inside.  Nevertheless, we caution the reader that the data 
available on damage and casualties in Tehran is sparse, and that we do not have a thorough 
                                               
    80 Private communication with Professor Fred Moavenzadeh, Director, Center for Construction, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 15 October 1992.  
    81 Data taken from 1986 National Census of Population and Housing, compiled by the Statistical Center of Iran. 





understanding of the various factors that played a role in modifying the consequences of the 
attacks on Tehran. 
 
Dud Warheads 
 Some Scud warheads landing in Israel simply failed to detonate; there were also reports of 
dud warheads in the Scud attacks on Tehran.82   By contrast, very few if any of the 518 V-2 
warheads landing in London failed to detonate.83  At least four Scud warheads striking Israel 
failed to detonate.  In the second attack on Israel (on 19 January, before Patriot was operational), 
one Scud warhead penetrated several floors of a building in downtown Tel Aviv before coming to 
rest in a ground-floor jewelry store, where it was recovered intact.84  In addition, one of the 
missiles fired at Israel did not carry an explosive warhead, but only concrete.85  Two other Scuds, 
one that fell on February 19 (number 3 on figure 1) and one that fell on a presently unknown 
date (number 13 on figure 1), were also duds.86  Based on this very limited data, the dud rate in 
                                               
    82 According to one source, "several" of the first 60 Scuds fired at Teheran in the 1988 War of the Cities failed 
to detonate.  Middle East Economic Digest, 19 March 1988, p. 10. 
    83 In the first 1,150 V-2 impacts in Britain and continental Europe, only two dud warheads were recovered.  In 
all, only four or five were found.  Strategic Bombing Survey, "V-Weapons in London," p. 9. 
    84 Joel Brinkley, "Israel Says It Must Strike at Iraqis but Indicates Willingness to Wait," New York Times, 20 
January 1991, p. 1.  There is also a report of an intact Scud warhead being recovered by a French ordnance team at 
the base of a mosque on 24 February in Riyadh.  Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Poor Workmanship Discovered in Scud 
Missile Fragments," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 11 March 1991, p. 61. 
    85 We have been able to confirm only one concrete warhead impact in Israel, although it is known that more 
than one Scud armed only with a concrete warhead was fired during the war (it is possible that the other(s) may 
have been fired at Saudi Arabia).  This Scud landed in the Negev desert in southern Israel. ("Iraq Fired Scud with 
Concrete Warhead," Flight International, 13-19 March 1991, p. 13; David Ellis, "...and Stone-Age Scuds," Time, 8 
April 1991, p. 21.).  Another report cites eyewitness accounts of warheads containing nothing but concrete.  
Hildreth, Evaluation of U.S. Army Assessment, p. 11. 
    86 These last two duds were presumably both engaged by Patriot and are presumably both claimed as warhead 
kills by the U.S. Army.  However, despite recovering the warheads, the Army could not produce for Congressional 
investigators any chemical or metallurgical evidence that Patriot was responsible for causing the warhead to fail to 
explode.  In no case was a Patriot warhead fragment recovered from a dud Scud warhead. 
 According to the Chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, "In the Army assessment, a 
dud Scud scored as a warhead kill if a Patriot had attempted an intercept.  However, many of the Scuds were duds 
to begin with.  Scuds were found with concrete warheads, or little explosive, or broken wires in the fuzing section.  
Several of these were scored as kills, even without corroborating evidence such as radar data.  The duds were often 





Israel was apparently somewhat greater than 10%. 
 A possibly related factor is that there were apparently no injuries in Israel from shrapnel 
produced by the warhead explosions.87  The Scud explosions apparently produced only small 
numbers of large fragments.  It is unclear whether this was by design, or whether it was due to 
some flaw in the warheads. 
 
Civil Defense 
 Most of the beneficial effect of civil defenses has already been accounted for in the 
discussion of warning time.  While most Israelis apparently followed their government's 
instructions and remained in sealed interior rooms rather than going to bomb shelters, this still 
provided much better protection than was available in Tehran or London, where there was no 
warning.  This is especially true given the reinforced concrete construction prevalent in Israeli 
apartment buildings.  In addition, Israel devoted substantial effort to rapid rescue efforts (e.g., 
sending helicopters aloft on warning of attack to rapidly pinpoint impact locations and using 
trained dogs to find people trapped in demolished buildings), and several people were rescued 
from under collapsed buildings with only minor injuries.  However, it is unlikely that Israeli 
efforts were much better than those of the British rescue services, which had experienced several 
years of German air attacks.  Thus, excluding warning time, civil defense probably played a minor 




 For ballistic missile attacks involving only small numbers of missiles, large statistical 
fluctuations in casualty rates would be expected.  Since, as we discuss above, only about thirteen 
warheads appear to have exploded in Israeli metropolitan areas, the statistics of small numbers 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
although in one case an Army officer thought a Patriot fragment caused a hole.  This opinion was not supported by 
any chemical or metallurgical analysis or recovery of a fragment.  Duds not engaged by Patriot showed similar 
damage."  John Conyers, Jr., "The Patriot Debate: Part 2," Arms Control Today, January/February, 1993, pp. 27, 
29. 





come into play and coincidence inevitably will be an significant factor in the casualty rate.  There 
is considerable anecdotal evidence that good fortune may have played a role in reducing 
casualties in Israel.  The following descriptions of the identifiable Scud impacts in the six attacks 
that inflicted the bulk of the damage give an indication of the role luck may have played. 
 In the first attack on Israel, at 2 am on 18 January, one Scud hit a densely populated 
neighborhood, but "at the edge of the only empty lot for blocks."88  The external walls of a number 
of buildings collapsed (but the buildings themselves did apparently did not collapse), but only 
light injuries from flying glass resulted.  Two other Scuds exploded at a shopping mall that was 
under construction in Haifa and at a leather factory near Tel Aviv, both of which would have 
been deserted at the time of the attack. 
 At about 7 am on 19 January, one of four incoming Scud warheads struck a building but 
failed to explode.89  Of the two warheads that did explode in or near Tel Aviv, one struck next to 
a municipal center, blowing open a basement that was used as a bomb shelter (but which was 
empty at the time), and the other fell in a park near the Tel Aviv exhibition center. 
 On 22 January, a missile landed in an alleyway between several apartment buildings, kill-
ing one person and injuring 84.90  One family was buried for several hours under the wreckage of 
their home, but they were not seriously injured.   
 At 6 pm on 25 January, two Scuds exploded a few hundred meters apart in a residential 
area.  One warhead destroyed a two-story house and severely damaged several others.  Another 
missile landed next to an empty school in a residential neighborhood, seriously damaging it.91  
However, only one man was killed in this attack and 67 were injured.  According to one report, 
two people in one house survived only because they disobeyed government instructions and went 
to their basement bomb shelter. 
                                               
    88 Sabra Chartrand, "A Day of False Alarms and Fear, Flanked by Real Explosions," New York Times, 19 
January 1991, p. 7. 
    89 Joel Brinkley, "Israel Says It Must Strike at Iraqis but Indicates Willingness to Wait," New York Times, 
January 20, 1991, p. A1. 
    90 William Claiborne and Jackson Diehl, "Dazed Israeli Survivors Assess Wreckage in Streets of Tel Aviv," 
Washington Post, January 23, 1991, p. A1. 





 On 9 February, a Scud struck in the middle of a road in a residential area of Ramat Gan.92 
 Although the front walls were pulled from buildings on both sides of the road, there were no 
deaths and no serious injuries. 
 On 12 February, a Scud struck between two private houses, demolishing both of them and 
seriously damaging a number of other houses.93  One of the two houses was empty; in the other an 
elderly man was buried and, with the assistance of dogs trained for rescuing earthquake victims, 
was rescued with only minor injuries.  Seven or eight people suffered minor injuries. 
 Two clear trends emerge from these reports.  First, many Scuds hit unoccupied sites that 
would have been occupied during the daytime.  Second, in instances where Scuds struck 
residential areas, the deaths and serious injuries appear to be lower than might be expected given 
the location of the impacts - although much of this effect may be attributable to Israeli building 
practices. 
 
ASSESSMENT OF EXPECTED CASUALTIES IN ISRAEL   
 As we discuss above, based on the V-2 experience, and taking into account the explosive 
yield of the modified Scud missiles and the population density of the Tel Aviv area, one would 
have expected 3.3 deaths, 8.1 serious injuries, and 17.6 slight injuries per missile exploding in a 
metropolitan area in Israel.94  By taking the availability of warning into account, these figures are 
reduced by roughly a factor of two, to 1.6 deaths, 4.7 serious injuries, and 6.2 slight injuries per 
missile.  Thus from the roughly 13 warheads we estimate exploded in Israeli metropolitan areas, 
we would expect a total of about 21 deaths, 61 serious injuries, and 81 slight injuries. 
 However, it is likely that a somewhat higher number of casualties would be expected, for 
several reasons.  Most importantly, the four or more Patriots that dove into the ground in Israel 
are not included in the above estimates.  Although the Patriot's explosive warhead is smaller than 
                                               
    92 "Tel Aviv Missile Attack Renews Feeling of Fear," Jerusalem Post, February 10, 1991, p. 2. 
    93 Seven Hurt, Homes Wrecked in Scud Attack No. 33," Jerusalem Post, February 13, 1991, p. 2. 
    94 Note that we do not treat Haifa (which is a smaller target but has a higher population density) separately.  
However, since only one missile Scud warhead explosion appears to have caused damage in Haifa, apparently 





the one in the Scud, it is likely that each of these missiles also contained a substantial amount of 
unburned rocket fuel at impact.  However, at present, little information is available about these 
Patriot impacts and their consequences.  In addition, some casualties could have resulted from 
Scuds that fell outside of metropolitan areas.95  It is also possible that there are a few missile 
impacts in Israeli metropolitan areas that we have not been able to identify.  Finally, as discussed 
previously, some casualties resulted from falling debris.  Thus it is likely that the total number of 
expected casualties should be somewhat higher than the above figures. 
 As we discussed earlier, the actual casualty totals were 2 deaths, 11 serious injuries, and 
about 220 slight injuries.  It appears that much of the apparent discrepancy between expected 
and actual casualties may be attributable to Israeli construction practices, which apparently 
played a crucial role by preventing the collapse of heavily damaged buildings.  As previously 
noted, the limited data from London indicates that the area of destruction for reinforced concrete 
buildings was eight times smaller than that for brick row houses.  If we apply this factor of eight to 
the expected total casualties in Israel, they are reduced to 2.6 deaths and 7.6 serious injuries.  
This factor of eight is probably too high, since not all of the residential buildings destroyed or 
damaged were of reinforced construction.  Nevertheless it is clear that construction practices 
played a crucial role in holding down deaths and serious injuries. 
 The influence of Israeli building practices on the number of slight injuries is less clear.  By 
preventing the collapse of damaged buildings, these construction practices may have in effect 
transformed deaths and serious injuries into slight injuries.  This may in part explain why the 
number of slight injuries in Israel (220) was actually higher than the 87 slight injuries (before 
taking building practices into account) that would be expected based on the V-2 experience.  
However, it is also possible that the standards for determining which injuries are significant 
enough to be reported were significantly different in London during World War II and in Israel in 
1991. 
                                               
    95 The almost 600 V-2s that fell outside the greater London area on average caused 0.38 deaths per missile; 
however, some of these were aimed at cities other than London (Dunn, Emergency Medical Services, p. 179).  In 
the Israeli case, it appears that Scuds falling outside metropolitan areas caused little damage and at most only a few 
injuries.  In Saudi Arabia, however, there was at least one Scud that fell outside Patriot's defended perimeter at 






 Given the significant statistical fluctuations in expected casualties that would be 
anticipated for such a small number of warhead explosions, the factors discussed in this paper 
appear to be able to account for the relatively small number of deaths and serious injuries in 
Israel.  However, it is also true that with such a small number of detonations, luck will inevitably 
play a role, and in terms of deaths and serious injuries, Israel's fortunes appear to have been 
relatively good.  Even a single direct hit on a densely occupied residential building could have 
drastically altered the casualties in Israel. 
 
PROPERTY DAMAGE IN ISRAEL 
 The available data on damage to buildings in Israel is incomplete and often inconsistent, 
but suggests the following overall picture: a total of 4,100 buildings were damaged in some way, 
and at least 28 of these buildings were destroyed.  Nine to twelve thousand apartments suffered 
some form of damage, with roughly 200 to 400 apartments destroyed, and roughly 1,600 to 2,500 
apartments suffering moderate to heavy damage.96 
 Based on the London experience, after scaling for the reduced yield of the modified Scud 
                                               
    96 The Jerusalem Post reports that a total of 4,095 buildings were damaged and that 1,644 families were 
evacuated in Israel.  The latter number probably corresponds to the number of apartments damaged seriously 
enough to render them at least temporarily uninhabitable.  ("Scud Toll: Summing Up the 39 Missile Attacks," 
Jerusalem Post, 1 March 1991, p. 2.) 
 A table in the Tel Aviv newspaper Ma'ariv gave totals for both the City of Tel Aviv and for the most 
heavily damaged Tel Aviv suburb, which was Ramat Gan.  In these two cities 7,559 apartments were damaged, 
with 2,493 of these heavily damaged (the article does not indicate how many apartments were actually destroyed).  
At least 28 buildings (containing about 118 apartments) were destroyed in Ramat Gan.  The descriptions of some 
of the individual attacks on Tel Aviv refer to 152 apartments being destroyed, but it appears that some of these may 
have been outside the city limits of Tel Aviv.  Another 1,700 apartments were damaged in Haifa, (although it 
appears that most of these were not heavily damaged).  Few if any apartments were destroyed in Haifa or anywhere 
else in Israel outside the Tel Aviv area.  (Ma'ariv, 29 March 1991.  An English translation of the table appears in 
Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War," pp. 141-144.) (continued . . . .) 
 (. . . continued) The data in the Ma'ariv article suggest that the number of apartments destroyed could be 
over 400.  Ma'ariv does not give a total for apartments destroyed within the city of Tel Aviv, but it does report that 
in Ramat Gan, 700 apartments needed major repairs and at least 118 apartments were destroyed.  Ma'ariv reports 
1,793 heavily damaged apartments in the city of Tel Aviv.  If the ratio between heavily damaged and destroyed 
apartments was the same as in Ramat Gan, then about 300 apartments would have been destroyed in Tel Aviv, for 
a total of over 400 apartments destroyed in Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan. 
     Another report cites a total of 12,118 apartments damaged in Israel, of which 195 were destroyed and 1609 
suffered moderate damage, with the remainder being only lightly damaged (BIAF--Israel Aviation and Space 
Magazine, No. 72 (Spring 1991), p. 31.).  According to the Israeli housing ministry, over 200 buildings were 





warhead and the greater population density of Tel Aviv, we would have expected about 90 
houses to have been destroyed and about 520 to have been seriously damaged by the roughly 
thirteen Scud warhead detonations in Israeli metropolitan areas. 
 Comparisons between London and Israel are not straightforward, however, because in 
London damage was reported in terms of the number of houses destroyed, whereas in Tel Aviv it 
was reported as numbers of apartments destroyed.  If a typical London row house is roughly 
comparable to three to five Tel Aviv apartments,97 then the number of apartments destroyed and 
seriously damaged in Tel Aviv would be in general agreement with the London experience.  
While this comparison is very rough, it suggests that property damage in Israel per warhead 
exploding on the ground was not anomalously low.   
 
THE SCUD ATTACKS ON SAUDI ARABIA 
 Although our primary emphasis is on the attacks against Israel, it is useful to consider 
briefly the attacks on Saudi Arabia.  About 42 modified Scud missiles landed in or near Saudi 
Arabia, 17 of which were fired at Riyadh and seven at King Khalid Military City (KKMC).  The 
remainder were apparently launched at the large airbase at Dhahran; at least five of these fell into 
the Persian Gulf.  It appears that as many as 29 or 30 of the Scuds fired at Saudi Arabia were 
engaged by Patriots.  The U.S. Army currently claims that 70 percent of the engagements in 
Saudi Arabia were successful, but, as noted previously, the Army says it has high confidence in 
only 40 percent of its claimed successful engagements, and there are reasons to believe that the 
actual percentage of warheads destroyed was much lower than the Army claims.  
 It is difficult to establish a clear picture of the effects of the attacks on Saudi Arabia 
because the Saudi government, which routinely downplayed the extent of the damage caused by 
the Scuds, has not released comprehensive damage or casualty data.  The 17 Scuds fired at 
Riyadh killed one person and injured more than 70, although most of the injuries were reportedly 
                                               
    97 Maps in Strategic Bombing Survey, V-Weapons in London, indicate a density of roughly one row house per 
300 m2.  Stein states that a typical Israeli apartment building contains 12-24 apartments and has a plan area of 750 
to 1,500 m2, or roughly 60 m2 per apartment.  (Stein, "Patriot Experience in the Gulf War," p. 221.)  Thus one row 
house in London corresponds to about five Tel Aviv apartments.  Allowing for open space around the Israeli 





minor.  Four explosions appear to have accounted for all of the casualties and almost all of the 
publicly reported damage in Riyadh (one of these explosions may have been due to an errant 
Patriot).  Since the population density of Riyadh is similar to that of wartime London, casualties 
at first glance again appear to be much lower than might have been expected from the number of 
missiles launched.  However, many of the same factors that resulted in lower casualties in Israel 
also appear to apply to Riyadh.98 
 There is relatively little data on damage or casualties due to the attacks on Dhahran and 
KKMC.  Other than the Scud that hit the U.S. military barracks, killing 28 and injuring 98, and a 
Scud that destroyed a house and an automobile repair workshop near KKMC (there were four 
minor injuries in this attack),99 there were no reports of casualties or significant damage.  Given 
the low population density of these areas, the 28 deaths at the barracks are almost certainly more 
than would have been anticipated from the number of impacts in these areas.  This simply 
illustrates the statistical nature of casualties from conventionally-armed ballistic missiles.100 
                                               
    98 Based on press and Saudi government accounts, only four explosions accounted for most of the damage and 
casualties in Riyadh.  Three of the four explosions were in areas that were unoccupied or nearly unoccupied, but 
which would have contained many people during the day.  The other Scud did hit a residential area at about 1 am 
on 3 February; 29 people were injured, but all were released from the hospital the same day. 
    99 It appears that this may be the only Scud that fell outside of areas covered by Patriot to cause significant 
damage. 
    100 A similar effect was also seen in London, where 537 deaths (more than 19% of the total) were due to only 





What if Chemical Warheads Had Been Used? 
 Although all of the missiles used by Iraq in its attacks on Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia 
were armed with conventional high-explosive warheads, Iraq had used aircraft-delivered 
chemical agents extensively against civilian and military targets during the Iran-Iraq War.  It was 
precisely for this reason that Israeli civil defense efforts concentrated on preparing the population 
for chemical attack.  Indeed, United Nations' inspections of Iraq after the Gulf War revealed the 
existence of several indigenously-produced chemical warheads for the Scud, as well as extensive 
programs to develop nuclear and biological weapons.   
 If the modified Scuds launched against Israel had been armed with chemical warheads, 
casualties could have been far greater.  Assuming that each chemical warhead could have effi-
ciently dispersed 70 kilograms of the nerve agent sarin over Tel Aviv,101 each attack would have 
created, under average weather conditions, an area of about 0.01 to 0.03 km2 in which unpro-
tected people would die; if the attack occurred during unfavorable weather conditions, the lethal 
area would increase to 0.2 to 0.3 km2.102  Since the population density of Tel Aviv during the 
attacks was about 6,000 per km2, a single chemical warhead would have had the potential to kill 
hundreds, and perhaps even thousands, of unprotected people.   
 The widespread availability of gas masks and sealed rooms would have substantially 
reduced, but would not have eliminated, casualties from chemical attacks.  It is commonly 
assumed that sealed rooms greatly reduce the dose received, but in fact a chemical agent will still 
leak in.  Even tightly sealed rooms will not afford much protection unless they are thoroughly 
ventilated as soon as the cloud passes, for otherwise the occupants will receive about the same 
dose as individuals remaining outdoors, but at a slower rate.103  Gas masks provide excellent 
                                               
    101 Only about 30 percent of the mass of a chemical warhead is agent, and the most efficient warheads could 
distribute no more than half of the agent as a fine, respirable aerosol.  Because of its high volatility and lethality, 
sarin--a nerve agent known to have been manufactured by Iraq--would be ideally suited for attacks on civilian 
populations. 
    102 Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction."  It should be noted that unfavorable 
weather conditions--calm, clear nights--occur frequently in desert climates. 
    103 If people remain inside buildings for several hours, the dose inside will be nearly equal to the dose outside.  
To see this, consider a house of volume V in which the residence time of air is T; air will flow into the house at a 
rate of V/T.  If the concentration of agent in the outside air is c for the time of the cloud passage t, then the amount 





protection against nerve agent, but they must be applied immediately and they must fit properly.  
Even among soldiers carrying masks and trained for chemical combat, the U.S. Army estimates 
that 4 to 8 percent of troops who would have died without masks will die nevertheless because of 
delayed masking, mask leakage, defective or missing masks, or early unmasking.104  The 
percentage of masking errors among civilians would undoubtedly be much higher; it seems 
unlikely that even the best civil defense program could reduce fatalities to much less than 10 
percent of the number that would die without protection.  Atropine, which was included in 
Israeli civil defense kits, can be an effective antidote for people who know that they have been 
exposed to high doses of agent, but the undeniable benefits of atropine and gas masks are 
counterbalanced to some extent by the consequences of their misuse by an untrained populace.  
Even in the absence of chemical attack, seven Israelis suffocated from improper use of gas masks, 
five died from heart attacks, and 815 were admitted to hospitals suffering from acute anxiety, 
unwarranted atropine injections, and from injuries sustained while rushing to shelters.105  If Iraq 
had used chemicals, the ensuing panic, which creates symptoms that can be mistaken for nerve-
agent poisoning, undoubtably would have led to far more casualties from heart attacks, atropine 
injections, and anxiety. 
 Thus, the impact of 14 chemical warheads in Israeli metropolitan areas might have caused 
on the order of 100 deaths if all of the attacks occurred under average weather conditions.  On 
the other hand, just one attack under unfavorable weather conditions could have killed as many 
people, even if the entire population was equipped with gas masks.  In addition, hundreds or 
thousands of additional casualties may have been caused by the indirect effects of chemical 
attacks.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Therefore, the time-integrated dose inside the house (CT) is equal to the dose outside (ct).  The effects of most 
chemical agents are insensitive to the time over which the dose is delivered.  If the building is tightly sealed, T will 
be large (e.g., 10 hours) and C initially will be much smaller than c, and occupants can greatly decrease their total 
dosage by ventilating the house after the cloud passes.  To do this, however, the occupants must be told when it is 
safe to go outside.  A series of chemical attacks, or fears of additional attacks, could keep people in their houses for 
many hours (which is comparable to the residence times of air in western dwellings). 
    104 FM 3-10, Employment of Chemical Agents (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, March 1966), p. 36. 






 Given the number of missiles fired, casualties in Israel at first glance appear to be very low 
compared to what might be expected based on previous ballistic-missile attacks. 
 Several characteristics of the modified Scud missile helped to limit damage and casualties. 
 The inaccuracy of the missile (together with what appears to be a roughly 10% dud rate) was a 
major factor in limiting damage.  Only about one-third of the Scud warheads detonated in Israeli 
metropolitan areas.  In addition, the reduced size of the warhead and the breakup of the modified 
missile diminished the lethal area of the Scud by more than a factor of two relative to the V-2s 
fired at London.   
 The warning time provided by U.S. launch-detection satellites was an important factor.  
The difference in the V-1 and V-2 casualty rates suggests that warning reduces casualties by an 
additional factor of two.  The Coalition air attacks that forced Iraq to launch their Scuds after 
dark, when most Israelis were at home, ready to move quickly into their sealed rooms, may also 
have made an important contribution.106  Israeli construction practices probably contributed 
greatly to casualty limitation by preventing the collapse of many heavily damaged buildings.   
 Given the significant statistical fluctuations that would be expected in a casualty rate 
based on such a small number of explosions, the factors discussed in this paper can account for 
the observed casualty rate in Israel.  Further, the damage to buildings appears to be generally 
comparable with the damage caused by V-2 impacts in London.  In addition, the anecdotal 
evidence discussed above suggests that, as far as casualties are concerned, Israel's luck was 
probably relatively good.  As illustrated by the Scud that hit the barracks in Dhahran and killed 
28 soldiers, shifting the impact point of a single missile by tens of meters could have changed the 
casualty statistics dramatically.  
 While the number of casualties in Israel was low, the available evidence does not support 
claims that this was due to the Patriot missile defense system.  Although the U.S. Army claims 
that Patriot destroyed from three to seven warheads that would otherwise have caused casualties, 
the available data contains no evidence for a reduction in casualties or damage due to Patriot. 
     Several important lessons can be drawn from the Gulf War experience. First, the widely held 
                                               





belief that ballistic missiles are themselves weapons of mass destruction is simply incorrect, as 
demonstrated by this as well as past episodes.  It is the nature of the warhead, not the mode of 
delivery, that counts.   
 Second, however, attacks with conventional warheads can vary greatly in lethality.  The 
Scuds fired by Iraq during the war were very inaccurate, had relatively small warheads, and had a 
significant dud rate.  Had the Iraqi missiles instead had a CEP of roughly 1 km or less (in which 
case almost all of them would have landed in Israeli metropolitan areas), and had a reliable 
explosive energy release comparable to the V-2 missile, their expected lethality would have been 
roughly seven times greater. 
 The Israeli experience also illustrates that in addition to the characteristics of the missile 
and warhead, other factors can have an important effect on the casualty rate.  These factors 
include the characteristics of the target (such as construction practices), the amount of warning 
available, and the timing of the attacks.  The type of building construction and its vulnerability to 
nearby explosions will in part determine the relative benefits of different civil defense measures.  
Depending on the size of the warhead, an underground shelter may only be marginally better at 
providing protection against a conventional explosive than an interior room in a building with 
steel-reinforced construction and non-load-bearing walls.  The Israeli government faced an 
apparent dilemma of whether to advise its population to go to underground shelters where they 
might be more vulnerable to chemical attack, or to stay in above-ground buildings, where they 
would presumably be more vulnerable to high-explosive warheads.  Had the civil defense benefits 
of reinforced steel construction been understood before the war began, this dilemma would have 
been eased. 
 The experience in Israel and Saudi Arabia also reemphasizes the World War II lesson 
derived from the different casualty rates from the V-1 and V-2 attacks: even a small amount of 
warning time of missile attack can significantly reduce casualties.  However, at present, only the 
United States and Russia have early-warning satellites (or large early-warning radars) capable of 
detecting missile launches, so a country under missile attack would be dependent on receiving 
warning from the U.S. or Russia.107   
                                               





 The distribution of the population during an attack will be affected by the time of attack; 
for example, several empty buildings that were hit by Scuds would have been occupied during the 
day.  Since the Coalition attacks on the launchers forced the Iraqis to launch primarily at night 
(and probably also reduced both the number of missiles fired and their accuracy), they played an 
important role in reducing casualties despite the fact that they apparently destroyed relatively few 
of the Iraqi mobile missile launchers.  For this reason, there may be benefits from attempting to 
attacking missile launchers even if these attacks are not highly successful.   
 Finally, the casualties in Israel, and particularly in Saudi Arabia, highlight the statistical 
nature of casualties caused by small numbers of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles.  Although 
there are steps that both the attacker and defender can take to change significantly the expected 
lethality of a ballistic missile attack, if the number of missiles fired is comparable to or smaller 
than that fired at Israel or Saudi Arabia, luck will inevitably play a key role in determining the 
final outcome. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Early Warning Downlink," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 13, 1993, p. 5.)  Under certain circumstances, it may 
be possible for radars associated with air or missile defense systems, such as Patriot, to detect a missile in either the 
boost or re-entry phases of its flight.  However, if detected during re-entry, there may not be sufficient time 









Chronology of the Scud Attacks in Israel and Saudi Arabia 
 
 Many details about the attacks on both Israel and Saudi Arabia remain classified or 
otherwise unavailable.  This chronology represents our best current assessment of events, and is 
constructed from a variety of often-contradictory public sources including U.S. and Israeli 
government announcements, newspaper and television news reports, and published articles as 
well as private communications from Israelis.108  All times given are local time in either israel or 
Saudi Arabia.109 
 It appears that about 81 Scuds fell in or near Israel and Saudi Arabia and that somewhat 
less than 47 of these were engaged by Patriot.110  It has also been reported that an additional small 
number of Scuds (roughly 5 to 8) failed shortly after launch and thus did not reach either Israel 
or Saudi Arabia.111 
                                               
    108 The most important sources used in constructing this chronology were: U.S. military press conferences (a 
very useful compilation of these is contained in Hildreth, "Evaluation of U.S. Army Assessment"; Official Israeli 
and Saudi Arabian statements (contained in FBIS); the compilation of attack damage in Ma'ariv (March 29, 1991) 
and the Jerusalem Post (March 1, 1991, p. 2); Joseph S. Bermudez, "Iraqi Missile Operations During Desert Storm 
-Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225; Bleich et. al., "Psychiatric Implications"; daily 
reporting in the New York Times, Washington Post, London Times, and Jerusalem Post; and television reports from 
the ABC, BBC, CBS, CNN, and NBC networks.  Much of the information on the Scud attacks in Israel (in 
particular, on impact locations) is based on interviews conducted by Reuven Pedatzur in Israel).   
 A generally similar chronology (based in large part on reporting by the Los Angeles Times) appears in 
Gregory S. Jones, The Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program: The Gulf War and the Future of the Missile Threat (Marina 
del Rey, Calif.: American Institute for Strategic Cooperation, 1992). 
    109 During the war, the time in Israel and Saudi Arabia was respectively 7 and 8 hours ahead of the time in the 
eastern United States. 
    110 The figure of 47 engagements was released by the U.S. Army after the war, but the Army's current figures 
are somewhat lower.  Conyers, "The Patriot Myth," note 3. 
    111 The U.S. Army reported that 88 Scuds were launched.  Another source says 86 Scuds were launched, but that 
five of them broke up immediately after launch (Bermudez, "Iraqi Missile Operations - Update").  The Iraqis claim 
that they launched 93 Scuds during the Gulf War (5 of which were a longer-range Scud variant called the al-









 It appears that about 39 Scuds fell into Israel or the adjoining Mediterranean Sea.  Twelve 
Scuds fell before Patriot was operational, and 27 afterwards, of which 17 were engaged.  The Scud 
attacks directly killed two people, seriously injured 11, and slightly injured another 220. 
 
January 18, about 2 am - 8 Scuds towards Tel Aviv and Haifa (probably five or six to Tel Aviv).  
Patriot was not yet operational.  One Scud hit in a poor and crowded neighborhood in the Ezra 
district of Tel Aviv, but hit "at the edge of the only empty lot for blocks."  A second Scud 
exploded at or near a leather factory in the Tel Aviv suburb of Azor.  Another Scud exploded at 
a shopping center under construction in Haifa.  Twenty-two injuries were reported (apparently 
all due to the Scud in the Ezra district), but most or all were light injuries. 
 
January 19, about 7:15 am - 4 Scuds towards Tel Aviv.  Patriot was not yet operational.  Three 
Scuds fell in Tel Aviv.  One directly struck a multi-story building in downtown Tel Aviv but did 
not explode, and its warhead was recovered intact from a ground-floor jewelry store.  One Scud 
hit directly next to a municipal center in Tel Aviv's Hatkiva district, blowing open a basement 
bomb shelter (it was unoccupied).  The impact point was only about three hundred meters from 
the one in the Ezra district the previous day, and most of the injuries on January 19 occurred 
here.  The third Scud fell in Yarkon Park, near the Tel Aviv exhibition center.  The fourth Scud 
reportedly fell along the coast somewhere south of Tel Aviv.  Thirty people were injured, 
apparently all lightly. 
 
January 22, about 8:40 pm - 1 Scud towards Tel Aviv.  This was the first Scud to be engaged by 
Patriot in Israel.  The Scud warhead detonated in an alleyway between two apartment buildings 
on Abba Hillel street in the northwestern part of the Tel Aviv suburb of Ramat Gan.  One 
building apparently collapsed, and many other buildings were damaged.  A woman was killed and 






January 23, about 10:20 pm - 1 Scud towards Haifa.  It was engaged by Patriot.  No casualties 
occurred, but falling debris caused some damage.  News media videos suggest that the Scud 
exploded in the Mediterranean. 
 
January 25, about 6 pm - 7 Scuds (some sources say only six) towards Tel Aviv and Haifa.  Most 
of these were towards Tel Aviv, and most or all were engaged by Patriot.112  No casualties or 
damage were reported in Haifa.  At least two Scuds exploded in residential areas in the Tel Aviv 
area.  In addition, at least three Patriots struck the ground in Tel Aviv on this night (as well as at 
least one in Haifa).  One Scud impact site was in Ramat Hatayasim in southeastern Tel Aviv; the 
Scud other fell only several hundred meters away across the border in neighboring Ramat Gan.  It 
is known that a missile struck a two-story house destroying it and damaging many nearby 
buildings, and another fell next to a school (for crippled children, according to one report) in a 
residential neighborhood, seriously damaging it; however we have not yet been able to correlate 
these explosions with specific impact points.  One Patriot struck in or near Hamaccabia Stadium, 
just north of downtown Tel Aviv.113  The impact points of the other Patriots are not known to us 
at present.  Falling debris also caused damage.  One man was killed (in Ramat Gan), and 67 were 
injured. 
 
January 26, about 10 pm -  5 Scuds (some sources say only three or four) towards Tel Aviv and 
Haifa.  The Scuds were reportedly fired in two salvos separated by a short period of time.  Most or 
all reportedly were engaged by Patriot.  One Scud apparently fell on a deserted stretch of beach 
north of downtown Tel Aviv.  No serious damage was caused, although two injuries occurred. 
 
                                               
    112 Most of the engagements in Israel took place in the two attacks on January 25 and 26.  It appears that there 
were at least seven engagements on other days in Israel.  If the figure of 17 total engagements in Israel is correct, 
then it appears that about 10 of the 12 Scuds on January 25 and 26 were engaged. 
    113 The photograph on page 296 of the short version of this paper published in Nature (Fetter, Lewis, and 
Gronlund, "Why Were Scud Casualties So Low?"), captioned "Scud launched from Iraq hits Tel Aviv at Night in 





January 28, about 9 pm - 1 Scud towards Tel Aviv.  The Scud fell short and landed near the 
village of Dir Balut in the West Bank (about 25 km east of Tel Aviv).  No casualties or serious 
damage were reported. 
 
January 31, about 7 pm - 1 Scud towards Tel Aviv.  Landed in the Samaria region, reportedly 
near an Arab village.  The U.S. reported that it landed 15 miles southeast of Tel Aviv.  No 
damage or casualties were reported. 
 
February 2, about 8:30 pm  - 1 Scud towards Tel Aviv.  It fell short and came down in an 
unsettled region of the West Bank.  No damage or casualties. 
 
February 3, about 1:40 am - 1 Scud towards Tel Aviv.  It fell short and landed in the West Bank.  
No casualties, but it may have caused some minor damage. 
 
February 9, about 2:40 am - 1 Scud towards Tel Aviv.  It was engaged by Patriot.  The warhead 
exploded in the middle of a street in the Tel Aviv suburb of Ramat Gan, pulling down walls on a 
number of buildings on both sides of the street.  Thirteen people were injured. 
 
February 11, about 7 pm - 1 Scud towards Tel Aviv.  It was engaged by Patriot.  It was reported to 
have hit in an uninhabited area, and it probably fell in the Mediterranean north of Tel Aviv.  No 
casualties or damage. 
 
February 12, about 1:30 am - 1 Scud towards Tel Aviv.  It was engaged by Patriot.  The warhead 
detonated between two houses in a neighborhood of mostly private homes in or near the town of 
Savyon, about 10 km east of Tel Aviv.  Both houses were demolished and a number of other 
houses were seriously damaged.  One of the demolished houses was empty, and a man was dug 
out from the debris of the other (he was not seriously injured).  Nine people were injured. 
 
February 16, about 8:10 pm - 2 Scuds, 1 towards Haifa, 1 towards southern Israel (although an 





towards Haifa was probably engaged by Patriot and may have fallen into the Mediterranean.  The 
one to southern Israel fell in an open area in the Negev desert and reportedly carried a concrete 
warhead.  No casualties or serious damage were reported.114 
 
February 19, about 7:50 pm - 1 Scud towards Tel Aviv.  It was engaged by Patriot.  The Scud 
landed in an uninhabited area about 7 to 11 km east of the municipal airport.  The Scud's 
warhead did not explode and no damage or casualties resulted.  
 
February 23, about 6:50 pm - 1 Scud towards Tel Aviv. It landed in an unpopulated area and 
there were no casualties or damage. 
 
February 25, about 3:40 am and 5:40 am - 2 Scuds towards southern Israel.  Both fell in 
unpopulated areas of the Negev region.  No significant damage was done, although two injuries 
were reported. 
 
                                               
    114 In all, Iraq fired three Scuds into the Negev desert in the southern part of Israel, probably aimed at the Israeli 
nuclear facility at Dimona.  The Iraqis claimed that they fired four Scuds at Israel on February 16, with three of 
them aimed at Dimona.  Bradley Burston, "Iraq: We Fired New Missile at Dimona," Jerusalem Post, February 18, 







 Approximately 42 Scuds fell in or near Saudi Arabia, and as many as 29 or 30 of these 
were engaged by Patriot.  At least five of the Scuds appear to have landed in the Persian Gulf.  
The Scud attacks killed 29 people and injured at least 175, with 28 of the deaths and 98 of the 
injuries caused by the single Scud that struck the U.S. barracks in Dhahran on February 25. 
 
January 18, about 4:30 am - Patriots at Dhahran were fired.  This was widely reported as first 
successful interception of an enemy ballistic missile, however, it is now known that this was a 
false alarm and that no Scud was present.115 
 
January 20, about 9:30 pm - 3 Scuds towards Dhahran.  Most or all were engaged by Patriots.  No 
reports of damage or casualties. 
 
January 21, about 12:45 am - 3 Scuds towards Dhahran, 4 towards Riyadh.  Two of the Scuds to 
Dhahran were engaged; the other was not and fell into the Persian Gulf.  No damage or casualties 
reported at Dhahran.  All four Scuds to Riyadh were reportedly engaged.  News media videotapes 
show at least two Scuds and one Patriot exploding on the ground in or near Riyadh.  An 
explosion near an office building produced a 10 foot crater and blew out the back of the building; 
news reports suggest that this was possibly the result of a Patriot striking the ground.  Twelve 
minor injuries were reported in Riyadh. 
 
January 21, about 10 pm - 1 Scud towards Dhahran.  It was not engaged and fell into the Persian 
Gulf. 
 
                                               
    115 Conyers, "The Patriot Myth," pp 3-4.  In all, it appears that about 24 Patriots were fired at "empty airspace." 
 Most of these accidental launches occurred during the first week of the war, and were apparently due to 
electromagnetic energy radiated by other Coalition forces entering the Patriot radar through its back.  Conyers, 
"The Patriot Myth," p. 7; and Joseph Lovece, "Electronic Noise from U.S. Gear Prompted Errant Patriots," Defense 





January 22, about 3:45 am - 2 Scuds towards Riyadh.  At least one (and possibly both) was 
engaged by Patriot.  A nearly intact Scud missile body -- minus its warhead and tail sections -- 
was found lying on a Riyadh street.  No damage or injuries reported. 
 
January 22, about 7:20 am - 3 Scuds towards Dhahran.  One was engaged, the other two were not 
and fell in the desert.  No damage or injuries reported. 
 
January 23, about 11 pm - 5 Scuds: 2 towards Dhahran, 1 towards King Khalid Military City (also 
often referred to as the Hafr-al-Batin area), and 2 towards Riyadh.  All 5 Scuds were reportedly 
engaged (although a Pentagon briefer said that one of the Scuds towards Riyadh was not engaged 
and fell in the desert).  No injuries or damage were reported. 
 
January 25, about 10:20 pm - 2 Scuds towards Riyadh.  Both were engaged by Patriot.  One Scud 
hit a six story Saudi Department of Interior building in downtown Riyadh.  The building was 
completely demolished; one man was killed and 30 people were injured, although most of the 
injuries were slight. 
 
January 26, about 3:30 am - 1 Scud towards Dhahran.  It was engaged by Patriot.  No reports of 
damage or casualties. 
 
January 26, about 11 pm - 1 Scud towards Riyadh.  It was engaged by Patriot.  The Scud warhead 
exploded in an area described as an "empty field" or "wasteland."  No casualties or damage were 
reported. 
 
January 28, about 9 pm - 1 Scud towards Riyadh.  It was reportedly engaged by Patriot.  Debris 
was reported to have fallen on a farm in the Riyadh suburbs, but no casualties or damage were 
reported. 
 
February 3, about 1 am - 1 Scud towards Riyadh.  It was engaged by Patriot.  The Scud warhead 





people were injured, although all of the injuries were apparently minor (all the injured were 
released from the hospital the same day). 
 
February 8, about 2 am - 1 Scud towards Riyadh.  It was engaged by Patriot.  It was reported that 
debris fell in a parking lot.  No casualties or damage were reported.   
 
February 11, about 10:20 pm - 1 Scud towards Riyadh.  It was engaged by Patriot.  The warhead 
exploded next to a school or university building, causing extensive damage.  Two security guards 
were slightly injured. 
 
February 14, about 11:45 am - 2 Scuds towards King Khalid Military City (or Hafir al-Batin).  
Neither Scud was engaged by Patriot apparently because they fell in an area not covered by the 
Patriot batteries at KKMC.  One Scud destroyed a house and a car maintenance workshop.  The 
other fell in a "civilian district" but apparently caused only minor damage (broken windows).  A 
total of four minor injuries from the two Scuds was reported. 
 
February 16, about 2 am - 1 Scud towards Dhahran.  It was not engaged and fell into the Persian 
Gulf. 
 
February 21, about 5:15 pm - 2 Scuds towards King Khalid Military City.  One was engaged by 
Patriot, the other reportedly "exploded on its own in the air."  No damage or casualties were 
reported.   
 
February 21, about 9 pm - 1 Scud towards King Khalid Military City.  It was not engaged and no 
casualties or damage were reported.  According to the US military, this Scud and the two 
previous ones were launched from inside the city limits of Baghdad. 
 
February 22, about 2:30 am - 1 Scud towards Dhahran (or possibly towards nearby Bahrain).  It 
was engaged by Patriot.  It was reported that the Scud fell into the Persian Gulf, and also that 






February 23, about 5 am - 1 Scud towards Dhahran.  It was not engaged and fell in an 
uninhabited desert area. 
 
February 24, about 4:40 am - 1 Scud towards Riyadh.  It was engaged by Patriot.  No casualties or 
damage were reported. 
 
February 24, about 12:30 pm - 1 Scud towards King Khalid Military City.  No information on 
whether it was engaged or on casualties or damage. 
 
February 24, about 9:30 pm116 - 1 Scud towards Riyadh.  It was engaged by Patriot.  No reports of 
damage or casualties. 
 
February 25. about 8:20 pm - 1 Scud towards Dhahran.  Due to a software problem, it was not 
engaged by Patriot.  The Scud warhead hit a U.S. military barracks, killing 28 U.S. military 
personnel and injuring 98 more. 
 
February 26, about 1:30 am - 1 Scud towards Dhahran (or possibly Qatar).  The Scud fell into the 
Persian Gulf. 
                                               
    116 There is considerable uncertainty about when this Scud fell.  The only source we have seen that gives a time 
and place for it is Bermudez, "Iraqi Missile Operations," and the time given there is used here.  However, the data 
from a Pentagon press briefing suggests that this Scud attack occurred late on the 23rd or earlier on the 24th.  It 
seems likely that this attack did occur on the 24th, since ABC news videotapes show two Patriot engagements od 
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